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FOREWORD 
Recognizing the I1eed for training of individuals to meet the rapic;lly 
rising problems connected with water resources development, Utah 
State University, with National Science Foundation support, organized 
a Summer Institute in Water Resources for college teachers. It was 
-hoped that participants carefully selected from all regions of the country 
would receive additional insight and stimulation to improve and enlarge 
water resources training programs at their own institutions. Thus, 
the accelerated disseminati.ortof such knowledge on a national scale 
could be facilitated. 
Realizing further that the ~ey to a successful institute of this 
nature lay in the excellence -of its staff, efforts were made to obtain 
instructors with intimate knowledge and broad experience in the 
subject matter area they were asked to present. In nearly every case 
those selected willingly accepted the invitation to participate, aJthough 
this meant considerab'le monetary sacrifice and major adjustment of 
busy schedules. 
The subject matter treated paralleled regular offerings listed in 
the University catalog and is considered to be "central ll or "core" to a 
water resources planning and management training program. One Gourse 
treated the philosophical, historical, institutional, political, and legal 
aspects of water development. The responsibility for this course was 
shared jointly by Cleve H. Milligan, Cha;rles E. Corker, and Wayne D. 
Criddle. The second course considered the principles of water resource 
economics and was presented by B. Delworth Gardner. The third cour~e 
dealt with concepts of water quality management and was under the 
direction of P .. H. McGauhey. The final course was on principles and 
procedures of regional resource planning and was presented jointly by 
Aaron Wiener, W. R. Derrick Sewell, and Harvey O. Banks. 
v 
Having a!?sembled a distip,guished and diversified staff to present 
some of the best current professional thinking in the topics suggested in 
the preceding paragraph, it was .felt most appropriate to attempt to put 
their lecture s into writing. .A proceedings of the Institute would have 
considerable utility beyond the Institute itself. Hence, the instructor~ 
were encouraged to prepare written material for the proceeding s and Were 
given secretarial and other assistance to aid them. This material has been 
organized according to the four major courses and is -issued in four com-
panion volume s. 
C~early; this has been a prodigious effort which required the 
Institute staff and others to "go the extra mile." Special thanks and 
recognition are d1,le Mrs. Dorothy Riley who not: only typed the entire 
proceedings but also attended to many details necessary for the success-
ful operation of the Institute. 
Jay M. Bagley served as director of the Institute and assumed a 
general coordinating and editing role in the development of these pro-
ceedings. 
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PREFACE 
This course is divided into two main sections: 1) economics 
of public policy, sometimes called "welfare economics"; and 2) 
evaluation of concepts, methods, and procedures used in planning 
and justifying water re source proj ects. 
Profe s sional economists will recognize that many important 
welfare topics have been passed over; others are merely introduced. 
In a short, summer session some recourse must be had to students' 
intuitive grasp of at least a few of the more esoteric implications. 
Most students possessing engineering backgrounds are able to progress 
very rapidly through the logical sequence of price theory propositions. 
Questions and personal interpretations are interspersed throughout 
the text, and students will find it worthwhile to work through them. 
Dr. Gardner organized and presented the course. Dr. 
LeBaron edited notes and materials used by institute participants and 
wrote the text. 
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PART I 
I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Economic Efficiency and Rationality 
Economic efficiency may be defined as the allocation of resources 
among competing ends in such a way that desired results are maximized. 
Since in actuality an infinity of desires exists, economists employ 
certain assumptions as first approximations to reality. For example, 
household members are assumed to wish to maximize utility or 
satisfaction from incomes, business firms wish to maximize profits, 
while owners of productive factors seek maximum returns. Economic 
theory postulates the logical set of relationships that must be satisfied 
to achieve these first approximations to real goals or desires. Ordi-
narily the maximizing decisions necessary to achieve even such 
generalized approximations are constrained by scarcity of resburces 
and institutional factors. 
Economic rationality is a formal attempt to link economic 
decisions with social and individual preferences. In the case of water 
resource development, a deliberate decision to establish ~aximization 
of net benefits as a social goal make s pos sible the analysis of public 
investment decisions in terms of whether expected results are likely 
to increase or decrease economic efficiency. 
Role of Efficiency Criterion in Resources Development 
Efficiency implications have been brought to bear on public 
works planning through the development and refinement of feasibility 
requirements. First introduced specifically in the Flood 
Control Act of 1936. these requirements were simply that project 
benefits must exceed estimated costs. In the early 1950' s the so-
called "Green Book" was adopted by the Bureau of Rec1am,ation as a 
guide for feasibility procedures to be used in evaluating river basin 
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development. The earlier criterion was not altered, but numerous sug-
gestions concerning measurement procedures were provided. The Corps 
of Engineers continued to follow rather different methods. A few years 
later Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47 was issued by the Executive 
• Branch of the government in an attempt to standardize the procedures of 
feasibility analysis among different agencies and bureaus, especially 
Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers.. Unfortunately, this attempt was 
unsuccessful. Therefore, in.theearlydays of the Kennedy administration, 
Senate Document 97 was issued to various branches of government. and 
standardization can now be expected. Much of the latter half of this course 
will be concerned with an evaluation of these project feasibility procedures. 
It may be interesting to speculate why· evaluation of feasibility analysis 
has been particularly tied, to water resources development. Perhaps the 
most important reason is. that contrary to many pu,blic works projects, 
westet:n reclamation developm~ntsare designed to directly augment certain 
scarce goods and service s, notably irrigation water and electrical power. 
Since markets for such products have been well established for years, 
price s were readily ascertainable for use in the determination of project 
benefits. Also, exactly because the planned outputs were also produced 
in the private sector of the economy, . it seems that some kind of economic 
justification should be required if federal products are to compete with 
those of the private sector. 
Why was the flowering of feasibility analysis delayed until the decades 
of the 1950' q and 1960' s? The explanation probably lies in the condition 
of the economy during efrlier times. In the 1930' s a large portion of the 
nation's resources were unemployed. Under those conditions completion 
of government projects did not require use of resources that would have 
otherWise been beneficially employed. Practically any increase in 
employTIlent could be assumed to represent obvious social gain; Pressures 
for adequate feasibility studies were absent through the early 194Q's because 
during the war years most water.developm·entswere arrested anyway. In 
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the 1950' s, during a period of high employment of resources, it became 
increasingly difficult to justify diversion of resources from the private 
sector for construction of public works. Diversion could be economicdly 
justified only if benefit-cost ratios could be demonstrated to be greater 
than unity. 
Pre s sure s for greater economic rationality also came with pas-
sage of the Full Employment Act in 1946 and the creation under this 
act of a Council of Economic Advisors. The Council was set up to 
advise the Pre~;ident on matters of economic policy. One effect of 
this a:ct has been that economists have had greater opportunity to 
create within the councils of governm.e;nt an awareness of the impor-
tance of economic anq.lysis. 
Over the past few years, as! competition for portions of the federal 
budget has been increasing. more and more aspects of water develop-
ment have been brought under the calculus of feasibility. There are 
signs on the horizon that other federal activities such as foreign aid, 
education, recreation, highway construction, and resource conserva-
tion will also come under closer economic scrutiny. This implies 
that feasibility analysis is at least in part accomplishing what it was 
designed to accomplish. 
Since feasibility analysis is essentially an investigation of the 
means whereby economic efficiency can be attained, the next section 
of the course will be devoted to an elaboration of efficiency principles. 
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II 
METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Positive Science, Norrnative Science, and Art 
Positive science is a body of systematized knowledge concerning 
. "what is." The object of a positive science is understanding of uni-
formities. The ultimate goal of positive science is development of 
theory or an hypothesis that yields valid and meaningful predictions 
about phenomena not yet observed. Positive science's work is that of 
demonstration, and this should be devoid of the imposition of the scientist's 
own value judgments as to what is good or bad, necessary or unnecessary, 
etc., in the analysis itself. 
Normative science may be defined as a body of systematized 
knowledge concerning "what ought to be." The object of normative 
science is the determination of an ideal or goal. Normative science's 
work is that of persuasion and conversion where value judgments are an 
integral part of the analysis. 
Art is a system of rules that enab~ the attainment of some specified 
end. The object of art is the formulation of rules and precepts. 
The discipline of economics as applied to water resource develop-
ment contains elements of all three of the above categories. Positive 
science is crucial in project evaluation. Normative science is important 
in justifying the need for greater efficiency in resource use and in project 
planning, and art is indispensible in project formulation and construction. 
The analytical power of economics, however, grows out of its development 
as a positivE: science. Because of this, primary attention will be focused 
on the effiCiency principles of positive economics. 
Ideally positive science is independent of particular ethical positions 
and normative judgments (9; 1st es say). Any policy conclusion must rest 
upon a prediction about the consequences of various alternative courses 
of action; this is the value of positive science: it leads to positive 
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propositions which can be subjected to empirical tests. This is a crucial 
point, because there seems to be fairly widespread agreement within our 
society on the goals and values that should be sought, but much disagree-
ment concerning the most efficient: means to accomplish these ends. The 
propositions of science can be brought to bear on means evaluation, and 
difficulties in choosing alternatives can be resolved. 
It was stated earlier that the goal of positive science is to develop 
theory suitable for prediction of future events. This theoretical frame-
work consists of two components: 
1. A language (this promotes organized methods of reasoning and 
generally consists of a set of tautologies). 
2. A body of substantive hypotheses (these are designed to abstract 
essential features from complex reality that aid in an under-
standing and explanation of real world phenomena). 
A useful theory will be: 
1. simple (to facilitate application); 
2. general enough to explain and contribute to understanding of 
a wide variety of events and phenomena; and 
3. testable (the hypotheses of theory must be confronted with 
evidence from the real world, and be subject to refutation). 
The validity of a theory depends on its ability to explain and predict real 
world events. One cannot make judgments about the validity of a theory 
on the basis of the realism of the as sumptions which underlie it. 
Simplification and generalization limit attention to essential features 
underlying behavior, and abstraction from all complexities of the req.1 
world which are not as sumed to be important to a whole clas s of 
phenomena. 
Solution of Policy Problems 
As an analytical device, the following four steps constitute an 
approach that may be used in viewing and solving a policy problem: 
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1. The optimum conditions from an abstract, ideal world are 
stated. 
2. The real world departures from this optimum are observed. 
3. Hypotheses are sought to explain the discrepancies between actual 
and optimum conditions, and the hypothe se s evaluated. 
4. Policies and institutions are formulated that will aid in approaching 
the optimum conditions. 
Means -End s Schema 
Talcott Parsons (18) has proposed a schema for studying policy issues 
that consists of the following components: . 
1. the actor (this is the action agency responsible for carrying out 
the policy activity); 
2. uncontrollable conditions of action (economists usually refer to 
these as exogenous factors which are imposed from the outside 
and which must be accepted as given and not subject to policy 
mani pulati on) ; 
3. controllable conditions of action (these are called endogenous 
factors and become the means for accomplishing policy goals); 
4. ends or objectives (these constitute the future state of affairs that 
is desired); and 
5. normative orientation of action (this consists of arriving at policy 
copclusions as revealed by selective standards). 
III 
PUBLIC POLICY AND WELFARE 
Welfare Economics 
\ 
Welfare economics is the branch of the discipline concerned with 
public policy is sue s. Emphasis is upon the impact of various public 
policies on individuals c;tnd group~. Often these impacts are so dif-
ficult to trace that the best that can be accomplished is to determine if 
the policy is beneficial to the aggregate community or society since 
decisions are made at that level. Such judgments obviously requi:re 
some kind of optirniz~ng goal. This .may be stated in a number of ways 
such as: "maximizing social welfare, " Or "mc;tximizing social net 
benefits. " or "the g:reatest good for the greatest number." Most of 
these statements are nebulous. empty of substance, and require 
translation into operational terms amenable to objective measurement. 
In the absence of a common denomil)ator for measurement there 
can be no quantitative description and analysis of policy alternatives. 
"Economic value" is the common denominator most often employed 
for this purpose. Even with respect to social values this requires 
that monetary quantities be ascribed to all benefits and costs that 
enter into the decision calculus. This is extremely difficult, even with 
water resource projects, since so many costs and benefits are un-
influenced by ordinary market forces which otherwise reveal so much 
about economic values. For this reason, various kinds of surrogates 
have to be established and employed. Some values seem to defy any 
kind of ec·oriomic quantification and it is difficult to know just how to 
handle such intangibles in project evaluation. 
The greatest general dilemma is that almost every public works 
program :.;-esults in gains to some citizens and losses to others. Do 
aggregate gains in fact offset aggregate losses? This cannot be 
4etermined merely by comparing the total value of output contributed 
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by a project with the total value of the resources used in an alternative 
project. Consideration must also be given to distribution of the product, 
and to allocation of costs among individuals and groups in society. 
For the last lOO years economists have asked themselves whether 
it is possible to evaluate social gains and losses in a scientific manner. 
Sorne' appreciation of suggested methods, as proposed by "das sical 
economists," "neoclas sical economists, " and "modern welfare 
economists 'i can best be obtained through a brief perusal of the history 
of certain economic thoughts. 
Resolution of the Dilemma 
Classical economists. In England, where economics made most 
of its early progress, policy questions relating to corn laws, to foreign 
trade·, to balance of payments, and to colonialism, were of great concern. 
In fact, political elements were so much a part oieconornic theory that 
early workers such as Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus were known as 
political" economists. The results'of economic analysis were often held 
to have normative implications. 
The position of the das sical economists relative to policy and 
com.munity welfare received its most precise expression at the hands 
of Jeremy Bentham (4; especially chapters I and XII). Bentham argued 
that utility (the power to satisfy human wants) possessed by commodities, 
could be measured in cardinal numbers. Some commodities would give 
negative satisfaction if they produced pain rather than pleasure. Addition 
of all the cardinal values of the pleasures and pains associated with the 
com.modity mix held by an individual at a given time indicated total net 
satisfaction. Not only could utility be thus quantified, but it was assumed 
to be comparable among individuals and thus could be aggregated to arrive 
.at community welfare. This pleasure-pain calculus was then used to evaluate 
the desirability of given policy proposals. Proposals leading to increases in 
total community utility were good. Bad proposals were those leading to a 
fall in aggregate utility. 
.J 
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The neoclassical economists. Of course, no one ever managed to 
actually measure utility. But for a generation before and after the turn 
of the century economists assumed that it was possible to at least say 
something about whether the direction of changes in utility were positive 
or negative. Knowledge of the" sign" of any change, in combination with 
certain as sumptions allowed a number of conclusions to be drawn con-
cerning social desirability of certain economic arrangements. Develop-
ments in the theory of demand during the 1870' s provided the necessary 
foundation for the whole process. 
During that decade Stanley J evons (11) in England, and Leon 
Walras (27) and Carl Menger (15) on the Continent, simultaneously hit 
upon the notion of diminishing margi:nal utility: the greater the quantity 
of income possessed by an individual, the smaller will be the utility 
produced through acquisition of additional or marginal units. Marshall (14) 
argued that the poor, who live close to the starvation level, of necessity 
used their incomes to satisfy immediate, crucial needs. The dollars 
spent on luxuries by the rich were not so vital since the need for food, 
clothing, and shelter were readily satisfied. Thus, an income re-
distribution associated with a transfer of wealth from the rich to the 
poor would result in greater community utility. Each dollar taken from 
a rich man would subtract less utility potential from his total purchasing 
power than it would add to the purchasing power of a poor man. 
The Benthamite notion of additivity of individuals' utilities and the 
"law" of diminishing marginal utility, when considered together, clearly 
indicate how one could judge the superiority of one income distribution 
over another. Policy proposals could be partially judged good or bad 
. on the basis of the expected changes in income distribution. 1 
1 Pushing this reasoning to its logical conclusion would mean that 
an equal distribution of income among all citizens would be the most pre-
ferred one. Even in our own society. we see evidence that' society seems 
to prefer a more equal distribution of income than the market would permit. 
Thus we have progressive income taxation, unemployment compensation, 
minimum wage laws, and numerous other public programs which, in effect 
(purportedly), transfer income and wealth from the rich to the poor. 
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The law of diminishing marginal utility was also an important de-
vice to explain how an economy's production would be allocated to optimize 
consumer satisfaction, given a particular pattern of income distribution. 
Allocation would be optimal, in terms of maximizing total social utility, 
when the ratios of marginal utilities of commodity units to their 
individual prices were equal in all directions. 1 Situations giving rise 
to ratio inequalitie s could therefore be judged bad. 
Alfred Marshall employed the concept of consumers' surplus as a 
welfare tool (14; Chapter VI). In Figure 1 the curve DD represents 
various quantities of a commodity that a consumer would be willing to 
take at various alternative prices during a given time period. Suppose 
that the market price is P as in Figure I, then the quantity Q would 
o 0 
be taken by the consumer. His expenditures for the commodity amount 
to (P Q ) (the rectangular area). However, the entire area under the 
o 0 
demand curve represents what the consumer would have been willing to 
pay for OQ units (provided the seller could have sold each unit individually). 
Consumers' surplus, therefore, roughly represents the amount of willing-
ness to pay over and above actual expenditures, and is understood to be 
an indication of the excess utility which consumers derive from the 
quantity obtained. All things equal, if the demand curve is steep, con-
sumers' surplus would be greater than if the demand curve is flat. As 
a rough approximation, commodities that have inelastic demand curves 
generate large quantities of consumer surplus. Many economists have 
followed Mar shall in using this tool to evaluate welfare implications of 
all sorts of economic policie s. 
The way this can be accomplished is not difficult to under stand. 
If the consumer s' surplus from an existing natural resource can be 
estimated, this value can be compared with gains in consumers' surplus 
1 The law of diminishing returns produces an analogous model for 
"optimum" allocation of resources to maximize output. 
" 
Value 
P 
o 
D 
Consumers' 
surplus 
Total expenditures 
by consumers 
D 
Quantity 
Figure 1. Illustration of consumers I surplus 
that resource development would promote. Unless the ~ gains are 
expected to be positive, development may be foregone or delayed. 
Marshall's successor at Cambridge University was A. C. Pigou. 
Pigou was more guarded in reaching conclusions concerning normative 
implications of economic theory than was Marshall because he believed 
there was some question about the logic of aggregating individual 
utilities into community utility. Pigou argued that the utility received 
by one consumer in the consumption of a commodity was a function of 
the consumption of other individuals. In addition, various kinds of 
market imperfections and considerations external to decision making 
units create divergencies between private costs and benefits (as 
revealed in market decisions) and social costs and benefits. This 
indicated a need for various kinds of ameliorating taxation and 
welfare programs (19, especially Part IV). 
For all of these reasons and others, Professor Pigou moved 
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directly to a concept of aggregate welfare. Termihg national income the 
social dividend, he argued that if the social dividend could be increased 
without worsening income distribution (that is, without injuring those 
individuals and groups at the lower end of the income distribution range) 
then aggregate welfare would be increased. Also welfare could be in-
creased if the poor could be made better off without decreasing the social 
dividend. None of Pigou's work constitutes a rejection of the law of 
diminishing marginal utility. It is the rationale for his concern with in-
come distribution problems and continues to .provide the foundation for a 
theory of demand and efficient commodity allocation. 
The "new" welfare economics.; In the 1930's there emerged a group 
of economists who put forward a p.ifferent viewpoint on the resolution of 
problems of ascertaining changes in economic welfare. This group was 
led by Lionel Robbins at the London School of Economics. Robbins 
began by denying the validity of interpersonal comparisons of utility. He 
argued, for example, that it cannot be determined whether taking a dollar 
from a rich person and giving it to a poor person would automatically 
increase aggregate welfare (23). Robbins and others in the so-called 
"new welfare school" also denied that cardinal measures of utility were 
possible; the best that could be said was that utility positions could be 
ranked in ordinal fashion. Such rankings can be displayed through the 
apparatus of the indifference map and certain limited welfare implications 
can be deduced. This group of economists was responsible for the wide-
spread practice of judging welfare gains in terms of the "paretian criterion, " 
which indicates that there would be a gain in total community welfare if at 
least one person can be made better off (by a given policy proposal) while 
none is made worse off (17; p. 617-18). "Better off" is measured solely 
in terms of opportunities to improve upon the efficiency of resource allocatioJ?. 
In terms of efficiency it is possible to determine the impact of policies and 
programs on aggregate income. Questions of good or bad income distribu-
tion must be left to one side where anthropologists, sociologists, and 
.. 
psychologists may as sist in evaluation. Economists have elaborated 
a set of efficiency conditions, satisfaction of which will indicate that 
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allocation of resources necessary to produce a maximum of economic ... ~ 
efficiency. The next section of this course will be devoted to a discus-
sion of these efficiency criteria. 
It is obvious, however, that the new welfare school left the 
discipline of economics in an extremely vulnerable position with regard 
to the prospects of providing definitive judgments about the goodnes s or 
badness of policy. This is because almost all kinds of imaginable 
policies leave some people in society better off and some people worse 
off. If utility is not cardinal and additive, and if interpersonal com-
parisons of utility are in fact impossible, then one is left in a weak 
position of judging good or bad policy only in terms of some of the 
obvious efficiency implications. If economic s cannot provide de-
finitive guides to "correct" policy, then, some have argued,observa-
tion of political processes and the ballot box could indicate welfare 
desires, particularly with respect to income distribution. 
It can be shown, however, that political processes might be 
logically inconsistent, and therefore unreliable as normative guides 
for policy. In a democracy every man has one vote, but that vote 
cannot be regarded as a measure of the intensity of feeling about the 
issue in question. A large, almost disinterested, group of voters 
could select an alternative which would greatly decrease the utility of 
an intensely interested smaller group. It is apparent that this process 
could sometimes lead to adoption of programs which would reduce com-
munity welfare. 
Kenneth Arrow has also shown that voting procedures can often 
be irrational (l). Consider three individuals, A, B, and C and 
their rankings of policies 1, 2, and 3 as set out in Table 1. 
Individuals A and C prefer alternative 1 to alternative 2. 
Individuals A and B prefer alternative 2 to alternative 3, and 
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Table 1. lncons istencies in vot ing patterns 
Alternative Individual Preference Rankings 
A B C 
1 1 st 3rd 2nd 
2 2nd 1 st 3rd 
3 3rd 2nd 1st 
individuals Band C prefer alternative 3 to alternative 1. Thus a 
majority prefers 1 to 2, and 2 to 3, but a majority also prefers 3 
to 1. Arrow concludes that, in general, a rule for pass ing from individual 
rankings to a social ordering consistent with his "reasonable" conditions 
cannot be found. It is likely that some kind of a compromise is the best 
solution at the present time. Economic analysis, including both efficiency 
and income distribution implications, can (at least in a general way) in-
dicate the economic impact of various policy alternatives; in the final 
analysis political processes will likely determine which policies and pro-
grams are actually implemented. 
It might be well to point out, however, that benefit-cost analysis, 
as used by Federal agencies, is essentially an efficiency evaluation. In-
come qistribution problems are considered hardly at all. This may be a 
serious omission since many kind$ of government projects are proposed 
and built precisely because of the existence of income distribution dis-
parities. Certain segments of the economy, and certa in geograph ic areas 
are often economically depressed and require govern:ment programs. But 
depress ion is not the only situation where government action has been 
deemed necessary. The economic history of the United States is marked by 
a whole series of programs in agriculture, tariff protection for certain 
industries, tax concessions to meet certain contingencies, education, etc. 
If public works programs are really designed to alter patterns of 
income distribution, then evaluations based purely upon efficiency considera-
tions follow questionable procedures. Having sa id th is, however, attention 
15 
must now be turned to discussion of Paretian optima. The sequence 
of the analysis shall treat in turn, the economic theory of the household, 
the business firm, and the allocation of productive services. These 
steps will detail the conditions that must be satisfied for efficient allocation 
of economic resources. 
16 
IV 
THEORY OF CONSUMPTION AND CONSUMER CHOICE 
In order to set forth efficiency conditions for optimal resource al-
location among consumers and to consider some welfare implications, it 
is necessary to develop a theory of consumer choice in a market economy. 
The analysis proceeds in two stages: 
1. Presentation of a theory of income allocation for individual 
households. 
2. Gcneralizatic<l of that tll.~ory to covel optimal ~ .. ~location df com-
modities in many households. 
Indifference Maps 
Imagine a simplified world of only two consumers, I and II, each 
having a given amount of purchas ing power. Suppose incomes must be 
spent on only two consumable products, X and Y, both of which produce 
positive amounts of utility. In addition, for analytical simplicity. assume 
that the markets for X and Yare perfectly competitive. That is to say, 
each consumer can buy all of X and Y that he wishes without affecting 
market prices. 
The first problem is to discover the optimum combination of X and 
Y that can be purchased by each consumer with a fix~d level of income. 
(The optimum combination is defined as that which will maxim ize the 
utility of the con:sum~r or members of his household.) The solution can 
be shown by employing the apparatus of an indifference map. On a two 
dimensional rectangular grid layout increasing quantities of X on one 
axis and increasing quantities of Y on the other. Then take all combina-
tions of X and Y that will produce U units of utility and connect all 
o 
these points with a continuous curve. The result is an indifference curve 
because household members will be equally satisfied with combinations at 
various points since they all represent the same level of utility. Other 
indifference curves can be derived in exactly the same fashion. The 
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requiretnent in each case is that the cOtnbinations of the X and Y tnust 
all represent different levels of utility. The result will be an entire in-
difference tnap for a consutner or for the tnetnbers of a household. The 
process can also be generalized to cover any nutnber of cotntnodities 
instead of only two.· 
I 
o 
p 
y 
Budget constraint with slope 
Y 
p 
x 
---p 
y 
X 
Figure 2. Indifference tnap and budget restraint solution 
of utility tnaxitnization probletn 
Why do indifference curves have the fortn shown in Figure 2? The 
slope of each curve is negative because as less Y is consutned, con-
sutnption of tnore X is necessary to offset the loss of Y in order to 
retna in at the satne level of utility. The curve is conve x to the origin 
in response to the law of dim.iniilhing tnarginal utility. As tnore and 
tnore X is substituted for Y, the additions to total utility frotn each 
unit of X become smaller and stnaller. At the satne titne the utility 
losses from giving up successive units of Y become larger and larger; 
in order to remain on the same indifference curve (utility level) the 
consumer demands more and more of X to compensate for each successive 
loss of a unit of Y. (If X and Y were perfect substitutes the indifference 
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curves would be linear.) In short, commodities X and Y substitute 
for each other at diminishing rates. 
It will be observed that indifference curves may not intersect since 
this would mean that consumers could be indifferent between combinations 
yet simultaneously prefer one of them. (Readers should satisfy themselves 
on this point by making appropriate adjustments in Fi.gure 2.) 
Indifference maps indicate tastes and preferences of consumers, 
but reveal nothing about their purchasing power. Purchasing power may 
be indicated on an indifference map in the form of a budget constraint or 
an expenditure curve. The problem will then be to ascertain a point on 
the budget curve which will maximize utility for the consumer. This is 
equivalent to saying that consumers desire to reach the highest in-
difference curve po s sible and still remain on their expenditure curve s. 
The conditions which must be met to fulfill these desires are perfectly 
straightforward once derivation of the budget constraint is understood. 
Let I be the constant level of family income over some relevant 
o 
time period. Let P be the price of X and P the price of Y. x is 
x y 
the quantity of X which will be taken and y the quantity of Y. If purchases 
are divided between X and Y then: 
I =Px+Py 
o x y 
Solving for y yields: 
I 
o Y = ______ --
P 
Y 
P 
x 
P 
Y 
x 
This is the general equation for a budget constraint and is a linear rela-
tion having a Y intercept I / P ,. and a slope, P /P . 
o Y x Y 
Examination of Fi.gure 2 indicates that the highest indifference curve 
the budget constraint could possibly touch would be a curve (U2 ) just 
. tangent to the constraint. Any other point on the budget constraint must 
f 
.. 
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necessarily intersect an indifference curve of lesser utility. This means 
that the optimal consumption allocation of X and Y is marked by the 
equality of the slopes of the indifference curve and the budget restraint 
at their point of tangency. At this point (P in Figure 2) condition 
dY P x 
--- = ---dX P 
Y 
must be true. In other words optimal allocation of income between X 
and Y requires that the marginal rate of substitution of X and Y in 
the preference map of the consumer equal the inverse of the market 
prices for the same commodities. 
In summary. the absolute amounts of X and Y taken is a 
function of the relative prices of X and Y. It is also apparent that as 
the price of X rises relative to the price of Y the slope of the budget 
constraint will increase. This will have the general effect of shifting 
the optimal consumption level in favor of commodity Y at the expense 
of commodity X. 
Demand and Elasticity 
From an indifference map it is possible to derive a demand curve 
which indicates quantities of a commodity which a household will take 
in the market at various alternative prices. Let the price of X vary 
and observe on the indifference map the various optimal consumption 
combinations of X and Y. If the results are recorded it will be 
found that they reveal a functional relationsh ip between the pr ice of 
X and the quantity demanded: a demand curve. A demand curve for 
Y or any of a number of other commodities may be obtained in the 
same fashion. 
By the term "price elasticity" economists refer to the percentage 
change in quantity taken that follows a one percent change in price. 
Mathematically. elastic ity is defined as 
zo 
dX P 
T] = dP' x 
where dX/ dP is the derivative of X with re spect to price, P is price 
at the point at which elasticity is measurE:d~ and X is the quantity at 
that point. If the demand curve has a negative slope, the sign of its 
elasticity will be negative. At any T] value greater than one but less 
than infinity, the demand curve is relatively elastic. T] values between 
zero and one are associated with relatively inelastic demand curves. 
The concept of elasticity has many functional uses in dealing with 
policy problems. For example, if demand is elastic, a larger quantity 
demanded will require a relatively greater expenditure to pay for it 
than will a smaller quantity demanded. The reverse is true if demand 
is inelastic. A small quantity will b~ worth more in the aggregate than 
will a large quantity, because price increases more than proportionately 
to quantity decrease s. This is a crucial factor in project feasibility 
studies because the quantity of a commodity or its close substitutes 
increase s when the project is brought into production. 
Also because elasticity is dimensionle ss, it means that it is 
possible to compare demand functions of different kinds of commodities 
to determine how price sensitive they are relative to each other. 
Figure 3 shows two demand curves, Dl and D Z' Dl is relatively 
inelastic over most of its range while D Z is relatively elastic over 
much of its range. Certain comparisons are meaningful even if Dl 
is for shoes and D Z is for billy goats. 
There are other elasticity concepts besides those reflecting price 
and quantity. Income elasticity refers to the percentage change in the 
quantity of a commodity demanded which re suIts from a one percent 
change in income. Mathematically this is expressed as 
dX I 
E = 
dI X 
Price 
Quantity 
Figure 3. Demand curves with generally different 
elasticity characteristic s 
Information for computing income elasticity may also be obtained from 
indifference maps. In Figure 4, for example, an increase in income 
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simply means that the budget constraint shifts to the right. This shift 
will in turn define a new optimal level of consumption of X and Y at pl. 
Y 
~------------~~----~------X 
Figure 4. Indifference curves illustrating changes in 
consump~ion patterns following an increase 
in income 
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If numerous levels of income are cons idered, observation of related 
optimal allocations 01 X and Y w ill reveal a functional relationsh ip 
between income and the quantity of either commodity. Figure 5 shows 
the relation between income and commodity X. If the 1uantity of X 
taken rises in response to an increase in income, the function will have 
a positive slope, income elasticity will take on a positive sign, and X 
is called a superior good. If the quantity taken falls in response to an 
increase in income, X is called an inferior good. 
While mose commodities are superior, there are some with very 
low income elasticities, and a few might even be inferior. Certain 
agr icultural commodities such as potatoes .and beans (which are con-
sumed in large quantities when incomes are low, but in decreasing 
quantities as incomes rise) may fall into the latter category. 
Income / quantity relationsh ips, and their measurement as income 
elasticities, are extremely useful in project evaluation. In a developing, 
growing economy where incomes are r is ing it is important to know the 
impact of changes in income levels on the demands for certain commodities, 
I 
Superior good 
Inferior good 
X 
Figure 5. Pos sible relations between income and quantity 
.demanded .' , . , .. 
especially those wh ich might be produced through project development. 
Some appreciation for what is called the cross demand relation-
sh ip (the relationsh ip between the relative pr ice of one commod ity and 
the quantity demanded of another) is also useful in feasibility studies. 
For example, what happens to the quantity of Y demanded as a result 
of a change in the price of X? Cross elasticity of demand may be de-
fined as follows: 
TJ yx = 
dY 
dP 
x 
P 
x 
Y 
The computed value indicates the percentage change in the amount of 
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Y taken following a one percent change in the price of X. A geometrical 
representation of possibilities is shown in Figure 6. The slope of the 
relationship and the sign of the elasticity will depend on whether products 
X and Yare substitutes in consumption or complements. If they are 
substitutes (such as beef and pork) the expected sign of the elasticity 
value would be pos itive. That is, as the price of beef rises, beef sales 
fall but pork consumption increases. On the other hand, if the commod ities 
P 
x if X and Yare substitute s 
if X and Yare complements 
Y 
Figure 6. Possible cross elasticity of demand relationships 
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./ 
are complements (such as bread and butter) the expected sign of the 
elasticity value would be negative. As the price of bread rises, bread 
sales fall, and so do those of butter. Correct assessment of cross 
demand relationships may be very important in evaluating total market 
impact on the quantitie s demanded of sub stitutable and complementary 
commodities as a result of p!"oject induced price changes. 
A number of refinements may be made in the foregoing concepts. 
For the present purposes, however, an especially rigorous development 
is unnecessary. Before leaving the area of consumption, however, the 
Paretian efficiency conditions for a whole economy should be explicitly 
set forth. 
Efficient Allocation of Commodities: Many Consumers 
Since optimal combinations of X and Y for any consuming unit 
can be determined by satisfying the equality 
dY P x 
----= ----dX P 
y 
the role played by marginal rates of substitution and price ratios in 
multi-unit allocation must be considered. It will be convenient to limit 
attention to a two person economy, although the optimum conditions 
po stulated can be generalized to fit any number of consumer s. 
The conditions which must be fulfilled to guarantee efficient al-
location of resources between two consuming units, I and II, can be 
illustrated by means of the "Edgeworth Box" shown in Figure 7 (7). The 
stocks of commodities X and Y available for allocation are as sumed to 
be fixed. Imagine that consumer's preferences can be ranked by ap-
propriate indifference maps. The indifference map of consumer I must 
have X and Y axes of finite length for the stocks of each are fixed; 
consumer I can only obtain a certain maximum of X or Y. regardless 
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of the size of his income. The same can be said for consumer II. If 
II's indifference map is rotated 1800 , and juxtaposed on I's map, the 
result is a rectangular "box" of fixed dimensions. 
I II 
Let Uland U 1 be indifference curves for consumers I and II 
respectively, as shown in Figure 7. Suppose the initial consumption 
patterns of I and II are such that each is at point P. 1 The total stocks 
of X and Yare divided: 01 - xl plus 01 - yI to consumer I and 
OIl _ xII plus OIl _ yII to consumer Y. Can total satisfaction be in 
creased by more efficient allocation? If the prices for X and Yare 
established in purely competitive markets, the answer is affirmative,. 
Assuming competition, the two conS1,lIDers face exactly the same set of 
relative prices, i. e., I and II both have budget constraints with the 
same slopes. If each consumer optimizes his utility from a given budget 
1 
Y 
I 
Y 
X II x 
.--------------------------,-------, 
----\--
_______________ •• x X 
OIl 
II 
Y 
Y 
Figure 7. "Edgeworth Box" method of establishing 
optimum consumption patterns 
Note to students: Why must both be at P (or Q, R, S, or any 
other single point)? 
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where 
-~ = dx 
then, by substitution, 
Px 
--Py 
(_ ~ ).II 
dY 
Optimum utility for all of society can only be achieved if the marginal 
rates of substitution of all commodities are equal for all consumers. In 
gratPhic terms, the indifference curves must be tangent. 
It is apparent that the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y is 
not the same for consumer I as for consumer II since the indifference 
curves have different slopes at point P. There will always be a gain in 
utility by shifting consumption about until consumers move to combina-
tions having· equal marginal rates of substitution. Movement from point 
P to poirit W in Figure 7 will satisfy the conditions of a Paretian optimum. 
Not only are the conditions for "efficient" individual allocations fulfilled 
but aggregate welfare has increased as judged by the Paretian cr iterion 
that an improvement in welfare has been made if at least one person can 
be made better off, while others are atleast not made worse off. At 
position W, for example,consumer I can get on higher indifference 
curve u~ while consumer II remains on the same indifference curve, 
UII 1 . 
The Paretian criterion limits movement to an area within the 
boundaries imposed by tre indifference curves uiI and Ui. Only in 
th is ar~a can one or both consumers be made better off without the other 
be ing hurt (providing P is the initial point). The locus of all the poss ible 
points of tangency of indifference curves lying between Wand Q is a 
portion of what is called the contract curvEl. Any redistribution of con-
sumption that results in a movement toward the contract curve segment, 
W - Q, represents a welfare or social utility increase. But note that all 
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points on the contract curve satisfy the conditions for a Paretian optimum 
in consumption. 
Which of the various points along the contract curve represents the 
"best" welfare position? It will be observed that, once on the curve, no 
movement can be made (along its length) which will not damage someone' s 
position. This does not mean that a unique Paretian optimum will not be 
selected as consumption is made more efficient. Given the distribution 
of income there is one and only one Paretian optimum achievable. If 
another Paretian optimum is desired, an arbitrary decision about income 
distribution must be made. Therefore, the economist alone cannot make 
judgments about welfare superior ity of various points along the contract 
curve. 
In summary, an efficient allocation of consumption among consumers 
requires: 
PX 
= = ---py 
The marginal rates of substitution of X for Y must be the same for all 
consumers and must equal the inverse of the ratio of the prices of the 
commodities. All of the foregoing assumes an economy free of monopoly 
or other imperfections. 
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V 
THEOR Y OF PRODUCTION AND COST 
Having considered the theory of demand as it relates to household 
and consumer markets, attention is now focused on the theory of supply. 
It will be shown that the supply of commodities is governed by cost relation-
ships associated with technical production possibilities. 
If it is assumed that the salient goal of the business firms is 
maximization of profits, three important questions must be answered 
relative to the production decisions of individual firms: 
1. What is the optimum mixture of .input factors? 
2. What is the optimum amount of each input for the quantity of 
product to be sold? 
3. What is the optimum amount of product that the firm will offer 
in the market? 
Elementary Production Analysis 
To answer the above questions, consider the following model. Let 
A represent the variable factors of production- -these are the inputs 
which are increased in number as a firm chooses to expand its output 
of product, X. B will represent fixed factors of production--these are 
factors which are committed to the productive process in a given lump 
and are independent of the quantity of product which is produced. Suppose 
the quantity of factor A is increased relative to factor B. If this increase 
is related to increases in output, X, a production function wili be 
generated. Any production function expresses purely engineering or 
technological relationships between outputs and inputs. 
As a working approximation it is convenient to assume that short 
run production possibilities are governed by the "law of diminishing re-
turns." Total output will increase at an increasing rate as factor A is 
applied relative to factor B, until an efficient combination of factors is 
" 
,0 
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used. At that point the function will cease to increase at an increasing 
rate and will begin to increase at a decreasing rate. If the quantity of 
factor A applied becomes too great, a point will eventually be reached 
where the total product will begin to decline (point 'Y in Figure 8). 
Average and marginal product functions may be derived from the 
total product function (TP). Average physical product, APP , is equal 
a 
to xl A or total product divided by the units of variable factor which are 
used. As diagrammed in Figure 8, APP will increase until the 
a 
average productivity of factor A relative to B reaches a maximum, 
after which it begins to decline and becomes asymptotic to the input 
axis (as long as the total product is pos itive). 
Let MPP equal the marginal physical product of the variable 
a . 
input. This is the slope of the total product function or dXI dA. In 
Figure 8, MPP rises with respect to TP until the point of inflection a . 
X I '" .. /-- .. III 
" 
'Y TP or X 
/ 
/ 
/ 
,/ 
,/ 
,/ 
,/ 
/ 
'" 
~ 
,/ 
,/ 
/ 
/ 
,/ 
,/ / 
,/ 
/ 
,/ 
,/ APP 
a 
--
A 
,/ B 
--
/ 
MPPb 
...... 
,/ MPP 
-- ,/ a --. 
Figure 8. Generalized production function relationships (law of 
diminishing returns operable) 
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in the output function. At this point the derivative, MPP, must begin 
a 
to decline. The value falls to zero as total physical product reaches its 
maximum and then becomes negative if absolute technological inefficiencies 
actually depress output. 
An arithmetic relationship between averages and marginals requires 
that MPP will always be 2_bove APP as long as the average is rising, 
a a 
and vice versa. MPP will equal APP where the average is at a maxi -
a a 
mum. APP must be a maximum at a point of tangency between the TP 
a 
functioCl and a ray through the origin of Figure 8. ~ is the point of diminish-
ing marginal returns; a is the point of diminishing average returns; and -y 
the point of dim in ish ing total returns. 
A movement along the horizontal axis from right to left, that is, 
toward the origin, d.ecreases factor A relative to factor B. Since this 
is the same as increasing factor B relative to factor A, a marginal 
physical product function can be derived for factor B in a manner analogous 
to the derivation of MFP for factor A. The marginal physical product 
a 
function for B is also diagrammed in Figure 8 (MPP
b
). 
Knowing nothing of the costs associated with factors A and B, it 
is nevertheless possible to make judgments concerning production de-
cisions purely on the basis of the technical relationships underlying TP. 
It is clear that rational production will be confined to stage II. Exam ina-
tion of Figure 8 reveals that the diagram can be divided into three sections 
or stages. Stage I includes output from zero to the point of maximum 
average prJduct. Stage II includes output between maximum average 
product and the point of maximum total product. Stage III includes all 
output where MPP is negative. 
a 
In stage 1, MPP b is negative. This means that add itions can be 
made to total product by failing to use some of factor B. The output 
returns to B are not positive until the second stage is reached. As 
long as factor B costs the firm someth ing to use, the firm will never 
produce in stage 1. Likewise, in stage III, MPP is negative. 
a 
This means 
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that total product can be increased by moving bac'k into stage II. Inso-
far as factor A costs something to use, managers will never produce in 
stage III. Stage II must account for all rational production. It will be 
observed that only in stage II are the marginal productivities of both 
factors A and B positive. 
Optimum Production 
The exact point in stage II where the firm chooses to produce will 
depend upon economic as well as technologic considerations. A final 
choice requires knowledge of product prices and prices of factors, The 
optimum combination of A and B "(i. e., the optimum production level 
in stage II) requires that the marginal prod~ct per dollar spent will be 
the same for factors A and B. This is a necessary condition for a 
Paretian optimum of production effic iency, Stated symbol ically the 
Paretian criterion is: 
MPP 
a 
P 
a 
= 
where P a and P b equal prices of factors A and B respectively. 
Stated verbally: as long as the marginal product per dollar spent for 
A is greater than for B the firm should use more A and less B. 
This will push production further into stage II, thereby reducing the 
marginal physical product of A and increasing marginal physical 
product of B. Once an equality of the ratios is reached the Paretian 
condition will be satisfied. This makes possible the pinpointing of an 
optimum factor mix. 
An alternative procedure (which will also satisfy the Paretian 
criterion) is to employ each factor up to that leve 1 where the marginal 
cost of the factor equals marginal returns to the firm. The physical 
return to the firm from using another unit of factor A has been defined 
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as MPP. Multiplying MPP by the selling price of the product X 
, a a 
which is produced, gives the value accruing to the firITl for each additional 
unit of A eITlployed. This for siITlplicity ITlight be called the value of the 
ITlarginal product of A (VMP). The cost of acquiring an additional unit 
a 
of A is siITlply the price of A if factor A is supplied to the firITl froITl a 
cOITlpetitive ITlarket. The optiITlal use of A is satisfied by the equality: 
P = MPP MR =VMP 
a a x a 
As long as VMP > P factor A should be expanded in use. With-
a a . 
in stage II, expansion of A relative to B rn.eans that MPP will decline 
a 
until the VMP equals the ITlarginal cost of A, (P). Precisely an 
a a 
analogous deITlonstration can and should be ITlade with respect to use of 
factor B in order to obtain the Paretian condition for both factor s. 
The ITlarginal physical product function for factor A has been lifted 
from the second stage in Figure 8, ITlultiplied by the selling price of X, 
and drawn as VMP in Figure 9. Factor A I S cost is a constant at the 
a 
level, P, since in a cOITlpetitive ITlarket a firITl can purchase all of factor 
a 
Marginal 
value 
product of 
A. P 
a 
P a 1------------....;::,,'"""=""---- Value of A to society. 
equilib riuITl 
Me (Market "wage" rate) 
a . 
MPP . P J VMP 
a x a 
A 
B 
Figure 9. Equilibrium input of variable factor in production 
A which it needs without paying increasingly higher prices. The point 
of intersection in Figure 9 satisfies the requirement that VMP = P . 
a a 
If optimum use of B requires that VMPb = P b then: 
MPP P = P (l) 
a x a 
and 
(2) 
Di viding both equations by P and (l) by P and (2) by P b gives: x a 
MPP
b 1 
MPP 1 
and a :::-- ::: 
P b P P 
P 
x a x 
Thus, MPP MPPb MPP P a a a (3) = or = P P b MPPb P b a 
33 
This is the proof for the Paretian efficiency conditions set out earlier. 1 
1 Graphically this result can be shown in a diagram completely 
analogous to the indifference apparatus employed earlier. Let a and b 
be variable factors of production used to produce product x. Choosing 
any output level, say 1 (lOx, plot all the combinations of A and B 
which will give that number of units. An iso-product curve connects all 
the points· representing output of 100x. Iso-product curves can be con-
structed for any other output level. Several output levels are imagined 
in Figure 10. Iso-product curves are convex to the origin because in 
stage II, MPP falls. As more A is substituted for B, MPP falls 
and relatively Ifnore of A is needed to hold output of X at the ~hosen 
level. This is because the losses in X that must be offset for reductions 
in B become ever greater as MPPb rises and vice versa. 
Suppose the firm has a fixed budget. If the price s for units of A 
and B are known, the linear cost constraint and its slope can be 
determined from the proof given in the case of consumption allocation 
(p. 19). The optimum combination of A and B is given by the tangency 
of the cost restraint and an iso-product curve. This is the highest 
production output attai:lable (approxima.tely l30x) with the given budget. The 
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If factor supply prices are set in competitive markets, all firms producing 
any product utilizing inputs A and B must combine A and B so that 
the ratios of marginal productivities are equal between firms: 
MPP 
ax 
= MPPbx 
MPP 
ay MPP an (4) 
In addition, if all firms sell outputs (X .. Y, Z, ••• n) in competitive 
markets, the most efficient allocation of resources (A, B, C, •.• m) is 
achieved. This is the allocation that produces the maximum output pos-
sible, given resource stocks and production budgets. If all firms both buy 
and sell in competitive markets, then the relationships of Figure 9 can be 
generalized into a matrix showing the necessary conditions that must 
criterion is: db --- --da 
B 
" lOOx 
" A 
• 
200x 
Figure 10. Iso-product determination of optimum combination 
of productive factor s 
(Students should compute the least cost budget to produce sax; P = $1, 
P b = $2. Question: What would linear iso-product curvesimply~ Question: 
What is the most significant difference between an iso-product map and an 
indifference map?) 
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prevail to insure an absolute maximum of production. The matrix shows 
that the value of the marginal product of any factor is equal in every use. 
Note that the actual relationships in the columns of the matrix are 
governed by whatever values are taken on by the ratios in equation (4). 
VMP = VMP = VMP 
ax ay az 
VMP = VMP = VMP 
mx my mz 
VMP = P 
an a 
VMP = P b bn 
. VMP = P 
mn m 
In summary: all the production arrangements to and including 
equation (4) will be satisfied automatically if all firms are operated on 
a profit seeking basis and obta in productive factors in competitive 
markets. These arrangements only guarantee profit maximiz ing oper-
ations, however. To maximize total economic production through 
automatic marketing processes, competition must also be the rule on 
the selling side; competition must exist in all directions. 
In most of the foregoing, it has been necessary to imagine existence 
of purely competitive markets. Numerous insights about production and 
cost relationships are masked if monopoly or imperfect market structures 
are not considered. In addition, markets for certain factors, such as 
labor, need special treatment. For these reasons, the theory of 
production will now be presented in terms of more conventional cost-
curve analys is. 
36 
VI 
COSTS p MARKET STRUCTURES. AND PARETIAN OPTIMALITY 
Accounting Cost and EconoITlic Cost 
Production accounting costs are cOITlposed of current outlays plus 
SOITle portion of the original purchase price of the fixed operating 
plant and facilities. The econoITlic cost of the saITle productive output 
is the current value, to other firITls. of the factor inputs used in 
production. EconoITlic cost is the broader of the two concepts be-
cause it focuses attention upon alternative allocation possib~lities and 
eITlphasizes the role of variable 01' out-of-pocket costs in ITlaking short 
run decisions. 
EconoITlic cost will be different for different group.s: for exaITlple, 
the cost of the services of a faITlous baseball player is different to his 
club, to hiITlself, and to society. The cost of water for, say, raising 
corn is the value of water for a different crop that ITlight be grown on 
the saITle land. EconoITlic costs ITlay be different for an industry and for 
a firITl; they ITlay also vary geographically. All inputs, regardless of 
ownership, can be analyzed on the basis of econoITlic cost. It should be 
noted that value in alternative uses is approxiITlated by ITlarket prices for 
all econoITlic goods having nUITlerous alternatives. 
Advantages of Using Alternative Cost Principles 
The alternative cost principle is internally consistent. All inputs 
can be costed, even those that involve no outlay paYITlents. Also the 
principle focuses attention on the relevant aspects of allocation of re-
sources. For exaITlple, a firITl can be expected to leave an industry 
when alternative eITlploYITlent of invested resources would exceed receipts 
from their present eITlploYITlent. 
EconoITlic cost will tell why resources are ITloving out of, say, 
agriculture. Irrigation water is a good exaITlple of such ITloveITlent; 
.' 
industry will pay more for water than will agriculture. As another 
example, it is often noted that firms may stay in business for long 
periods even though they incur accounting losses. That is, they are 
able to cover their operating costs and may earn little or noth ing on 
fixed investments. This situation is an indication that such firms' in-
vestments or assets may have been overvalued. 
Rent, Profit, and Depreciation 
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In contrast with cost, rent is a return. Economic rent is the dif-
ference between what a factor earns in its best employment and what it 
could earn in its next best employm~nt, that is, its opportunity cost. 
While it is pos sible that numerous factors earn rents for a firm, from 
the accounting standpoint, all such rents are aggregated as the total 
return on the fixed investment. For a firm to be viable over the long 
run, returns to the fixed investment must cover deprec iation and interest 
on capital. Any remainder is termed pure profit by economists. From 
an accounting standpoint all earnings over and above depreciation al-
lowances and payments for use of non-owned capital are called profits. 
If the demand for a product is very elastic, in general, a smaller 
amount of rent would be expected. Just as in the, case of opportunity 
cost, rent magnitudes vary according to whether they are viewed by 
industry, by firms, or according to individual commodities. 
Production and Product Markets 
Definitions. In the short run certain production factors tend to be 
fixed in magnitude. They are not affected by output and often should be 
ignored when making profit maximiz ing decis ions. In the long run all 
factors are variable, including the physical size of a firm's productive' 
facilities and planning alternatives. The, notion of long run production is 
a planning concept that requires consideration be given to the opportunity 
cost of every factor of production under consideration. Thus sunk costs 
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or fixed costs are commitments which the firm is unable to avoid. 
Quantities of variable factors change as output is altered. 
ATC TC =--x 
where ATC = average total cost, TC = total cost, and X = output units. 
AVC = 
TVC 
X 
A.P 
a 
-~:--- = X 
A 
X 
P 
a P =---
a APP 
a 
where AVC = average variable cost, TVC = total variable cost, A = 
variable input, and APP = average physical product of A. 
a 
.6.A·P P 
.6. TC a a 
MC = 
dTC 
dX - - --......... ---- = ---.... ........... -- .6.X-- .6. X MPP 
where MC = marginal cost. 
AFC = 
TFC 
X 
a 
where AFC = average fixed costs. TFC = total fixed costs. 
ATC = AVC + AFC 
Short run production. The important curves in the short run are: 
average total cost, average variable cost, and marginal cost. Figure 
11 is an illustration of the typical relationships between short· run co st 
curves. The generalized shapes are based upon the notion of diminishing 
returns •. It will be recalled, from the production function analysis made 
earlier,that much of stage I of a technological production function is as-
sociated with increasing returns to successive, variable, outlays. This is 
the same as saying that costs per unit of output fall until diminishing returns 
set in. Then costs per unit of output begin to rise. The minimum point 
., 
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p 
x 
MC 
ATC 
_ A''{_ C MR AR 
4' 4 
- - -
MR3' AR3 
- - - - - - - MR Z ' ARZ 
-----MR AR 
l' 1 
.-----AFC 
Figure 11. Short run costs and profit maximizing output (competition) 
on the marginal cost curve of Figure 11, corresponds to the output as-
sodated with the onset of diminishing marginal returns on the total product 
curve of Figure 8. The end of stage I in Figure 8, therefore, is the point 
where AVC is at a minimum in Figu!e 11. 
Suppose that all units of X can be sold at a constant price. This 
will be illustrated by drawing a horizontal line in Figure 11 at the 
appropriate price level. Suppose this level is below the point where 
AVC is at a minimum. This would mean that the revenue per unit would 
not be great enough to cover even the average or direct costs of production 
and the firm would have to go out of business. If production takes place 
at all, therefore, it must take place in stage II. This must be so, because 
any unit revenue higher than where AVC is a minimum, must be indicated 
by two intersections of the hor izontal average revenue curve with the AVC 
curve. Only the intersection to the right of the minimum point on the 
Ave curve has any economic significance. 
Tne horizontal curve of unit revenues, is really a demand curve 
because total revenue divided by sales equals average revenue (AR). 
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Individual firms face horizontal demand curves when they sell in purely 
competitive markets. In competitive markets, business managers have 
no control over the levels of selling prices ~ As long as market prices 
are constant, each unit sold returns a constant average revenue. Each 
successive unit sold also increases total revenues an amount exactly 
equal to those of the sales of previous units. Additions to total revenue 
are called marginal revenues (MR) and in competitive markets MR = AR. 
The point where a firm maximizes profits or minimizes losses is 
at the output determined by the intersection of MR and MC. Output short 
of this intersection can be expanded because additions to total revenue will 
exceed additions to total costs. Output bey<?nd this intersection adds more 
to cost than to revenue. Profit maximizing output under purely competi-
tive conditions requires that MC = MR = AR. 
In Figure 'II, if P x = (0, P l) the firm will incur accounting losses 
at output (0, Xl) because ATC > AR. Total losses equal (0, Xl) (ATC - AR). 
[Students should prove that total losses will increase if any output other 
than (0, Xl) is chosen. J 
Suppose AR rises to P
x 
= (0, P 3 ). Then AR =ATC andtotal 
revenue equals total cost. (Question:~ Would any accounting profits be 
earned?) If AR rises to P x = (0, P 4)' optimum output would be (0, X4 ). 
[What is the quantity of pure profit?; prove that this quantity would be re-
duced if any output other than (0, X
4
) is chosen.}l 
A monopolist faces a negatively sloped demand curve; if he wants to 
increase sales, prices must be reduced. But if prices are reduced his 
total receipts are not increased by AQ· Pl' They are increased by 
lA . sSlgnment. 
1 .. Make diagram(s) to illustrate what the cost-revenue curves 
would look like for a competitive industry producing X in the 
long run. 
l. Prove that profit ('TT) is maximized at output level (Q) where 
dTR/dQ = dTC/dQ. 
'" 
,) 
{J 
" 
p 
x 
AR 
QI-Q2 
x 
Figure 12. Graphic computation of marginal revenue 
(area A less area B) 
(6Q . P 2) - (Ql . 6P). Marginal revenue per unit of 6Q is evidently 
less than the average revenue. If the demand curve is not horizontal, 
there must be a separate marginal revenue function (Remember the 
earlier rule: if averages are falling, marginals must be below). It 
happens that the slope of any monopolist's MR curve is double that of 
the associated demand curve. 
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But a downward sloping demand curve doesn't change the rule for 
achieving equilibrium output for the firm. Under monopoly conditions, 
the rule still remains: adjust output until Me = MR. The profit 
maximizing result is diagrammed in Figure 13. The profit block has 
been marked. (Sketch in the economic rent accruing to the fixed factors. 
Suppose fixed costs were doubled, what adjustments would be necessary 
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P 
xo 
P 
x 
, 
Marginal value 
to society 
'--
x 
o (Comp. output) 
AR, D, P 
x 
x·----'l .. ~
Figure 13. Profit maximizing in imperfect markets 
in output? What if the cost increase converted profits into losses? 
Should prices be increased? Hint: do not forget elasticity implications. ) 
Output equilibrium where MC I = MR, although good for the firm, 
is not satisfactory to society because MC
I 
fAR. Society wants pro-
duction where MC
I 
= AR because this is what could be achieved under 
competition. And under competition (in all directions) a maximum of 
social output can be achieved. 
Only in competition can one get a Paretian optimum. To get the 
firm to voluntarily expand production it is necessary that MC 2 = MR. 
To achieve this condition a marginal subsidy per unit of commodity can 
be given. together with the imposition of a lump sum tax on any profits 
that might result directly from the cost lowering operation. The MC I 
curve will shift downward with the sub sidy and the optimum of the firm 
is shifted to the right to meet society's optimum. Paretian efficiency 
optimum requires prices equal to marginal costs; this implies that 
MC j = MCk for any two or more firms producing X. 
.. 
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Long Run Equilibrium 
In the short run, an equilibrium condition for a firm can be deter-
mined which reflects size of plant and all productive factors, In Figure 
14, a profitable and efficient equilibrium operation is illustrated where 
AR = P xl' Output X
ol is not efficient in the long run because other firms 
will be attracted by the profits and decide to enter the industry. When 
they do enter the industry, supplies will increase and reduce market 
P 
x 
----:..-t 
I I 
I I 
I 
I 
MC 
ATC 
D, MR , AR 
x x 
x 
Figure 14. Competitive equilibrium in long run 
prices to the level of, say, P
x2 ' At level P x2 ' MR < ATC and losses x x 
will be incurred. Some firms will therefore leave the industry and the 
demand curve will return to an intermediate position representing long 
run equilibrium at a level where MR = AR = ATC = MC (AR = P 3 
x x x x x 
in Figure l4). 
Long run average cost (LRAC) can be delineated by mapping short 
run average cost (SRAC) curves for all potential plant sizes. What is 
required is an envelope of the lower portions of the SRAC fami! y. The 
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resulting LRAG curve is U-shaped because as potential plant sizes 
increase the.re comes a point where management factors begin to lag or 
interfere with engineering efficiencies. The long run marginal cost 
P, C 
LRMC 
/ 
SRAC 1 
Figure 15. Construction of long run cost curves 
(LRMC) curve is the fiTst derivative of long run total costs. 
LRMC = _d.....:(_L_R~A_C_._Q.....:....) dQ 
LRAC 
~ 
x 
Effect of size. Often it is pos sible to at least gauge the long run 
cost structure (the sc.ale factors) of the. firms of an industry by observing 
the industry changes over time. For example. if small firms in the 
industry seem to be those going broke, this suggests increasing 
returns. to scale (decreasing costs). If an industry contains 
firms. of diverse sizes and all seem to be equally profitable, 
then constant returns to scale are implied. Most attempts. at direct 
estimates of long run cost curves have found increasing returns to 
scale. A few industries may have firms large enough to have inefficient 
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technology and management, thefeby forcing their long run cost curves 
to turn up. Theoretically, however, decreasing returns will eventually 
be reached if firms continue to e;"pand size s. Figure 16 illustrate s the 
theoretically possible scale relationships. 
p 
x 
LRAC 
(decreasing returns 
to scale) 
----------~----------~~----------LRAC 
LRAC 
x 
(constant returns 
to scale) 
(increasing returns 
to scale) 
Figure 16. Ob served effects of returns to scale on LRAC 
Marginal cost and returns to scale. Constant returns to scale can 
only be associated with production functions which are linear and homo-
geneous of degree one. In this case X I A = dX IdA for every value of X 
1 
and marginal cost and average cost must always be equal. 
1 . Suppose all factor mputs receive in wage s the value of their 
marginal products (Figure 9). Will the entire product be paid out to the 
inputs? or will something be left over? Indeed, is there always enough 
total production to "pay-off" all claims against production? If production 
is marfed by constant returns to scale, it can be shown that the sum of 
marginal products will add up to the total product. This is connected 
with a standard mathematical re sult called Euler's Theorem. 
To derive Euler's Theorem it may be noted that for any linear 
homogeneous production function, P = g(L, C) there is, for any k, 
kP = g(kL, kC). 
The derivation of kP with respect to k, 
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If returns to scale are decreasing, then long run marginal costs 
will be above average costs. The reverse is true in the cost of decreasing 
returns. 
Diseconomies of scale can occur both internal to individual firms 
and external to them. An example of an internal technological diseconomy 
would be when the firm got so large that management could not effectively 
manipulate the inputs under its control. An example of an external dis-. 
economy might be where all the firms expand and the effect of the en-
larged industry is decreased efficiency, as in the case where expansion 
of a number of trucking firms would lead to congestion on the highways 
and impose higher costs on all firms. 
Economies of scale are likewise external and internal to the firm. 
An example of an internal economy would be when a firm, by expanding, 
can adopt mas s production techniques and thus increase efficiency. 
These types of economies are very prevalent. An example of an external 
or 
dkP 
dK 
= og 
okL 
p = ogL 
o kL 
og 
+ 0 kC 
dkL og 
dk + okC 
dkC 
dk 
dkC 
dk 
Since this holds for any value of k it must hold for k - I and, 
8g/ a Land og/oC are the marginal products of labor and capital 
respectively. Thus the equation states that MPP L . AL (each of whom 
is paid this amount) plus a corresponding total paymentto capital, 
exactly equals the total product. 
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economy would be when two or more firms combine forces to provide 
joint facilities or services for each other than would increase efficiency. 
All internal and some external "effects" must be reflected in a 
firm's cost curves in one of the three ways shown in Figure 16. But 
these effects are not always reflected in alternative costs to society. 
Pecuniary effects do not alter society's costs. If a firm expands pro-
duction, bidding for increased labor supplies will drive up labor costs 
for the entire industry. But this is a pecuniary effect; society does not 
get any less labor services in total, even if there is some re-allocation 
of labor resources. 
Technological effects are associated with such things as the in-
creased production of smoke. The only costs the firm must face are 
for the additional factors altering production enough to increase smoke 
output. But laundry bills for housewives and medical bills for lung ail-
ments may rise and physical resources that might be used otherwise 
must be devoted to additional cleaning and hospital care. 
Decreasing cost industries. As long as AC is declining then 
MC (AC. Optimum production in competitive selling markets is where 
MC = AR, and in the case shown in Figure 17 a loss is incurred. In 
this situation, average costs can never be recovered by relying solely 
upon marginal cost pricing. Average cost pricing will restrict 
P 
x 
x 
o 
LRAC 
D, AR 
LRMC 
Figure 17. Unit subsidy for competitive decreasing 
cost industry 
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consumption below levels of what people are willing to pay at the margin. 
The losses can be subsidized; covering AC is an income distribution 
problem. The point in this situation is that the "natural tendency" will 
be for production and sale s to be at the (0, X ) level in Figure 17. 
o 
In Figure 18 the decreasing cost situation is altered by the fact 
that the selling market is monopolized to some degree by an individual 
firm. This decreasing cost situation is pretty close to real life 
experience of many public utilities. The natural tendency is for the 
firm to price where MC = MR, but this is below the socially de sirable 
output (0, Xl)' Thus the problem is not merely that of subsidizing 
losses; in addition the firm must be induced to increase output. This 
requires a per unit subsidy to lower marginal costs as shown in Figure 
18. )f average costs fall enough in the process to give rise to pure 
profits, a lump- sum tax may be used to recover part of the subsidy. 
p 
x 
-
o 
subsidy 
LRAC 
MR 
LRMC 
and AC 
X 
Figure 18. Tax/bounty treatment for monopolistic decreasing cost 
industry 
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Pricing of Productive Service s 
This section will consider the application of the Paretian optimum 
to factor markets. Given competition it was asserted that efficient factor 
allocation required P = MPP 'P . 
a a x 
It was hinted earlier (p. 35 ) that 
the fact that both factor and commodity markets are involved in any 
production/ selling arrangement may give rise to allocative restrictions. 
Factor and commodity markets can operate under four combinations of 
competition or mopopoly as follows: 
Table 2. Factor - product market pos sibilitie s 
Case Product Factor Equilibrium 
1 competition competition P = MPP P 
a a x 
2 monopoly competition P = MPP MR 
a a x 
3 competition monopsony MFC = MPP P 
a a x 
4 monopoly monopsony MFC = MPP MR 
a a 
~ase 1: competition (factor) - competition (product). Value of 
the marginal product of A equals MPP times the net increase in 
a 
revenue from sale s of additional units of X. Since X is sold in 
competitive markets, MR = P . 
x 
Supplies of factor A are assumed 
x 
to be purchased in competitive markets. This means that additional 
units 6f A can be obtained at constant unit prices. The additional or 
marginal factor costs (MFC) equals the average supply price (P A) or 
wage rate (W). 
In connection with the equilibrium condition illustrated in Figure 
19 it should be noted that the marginal unit of factor A receive s the 
entire value of its marginal product. 
Case 2: competition (factor) - monopoly (product). A profit 
maximizing firm will not equate V~P = P in this market gituation. 
a a 
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P , VMP 
a a 
P
Ao MFCA , W 
VMP A = MPP A • P x 
A 
o 
A 
B 
Figure 19. Productive services equilibrium: case 1 
When sales are made in a monopolistic market, the value of MPP 
a 
the firm is governed by marginal revenues, not average. Thus the 
to 
value is obtained by multiplying MPP . MR . 1 The result is termed 
. a x 
marginal revenue product (MRP). This nomenclature change is a 
reminder that the· analysis is no longer in terms of competitive selling. 
(Students should prove that MRP = P is equivalent to MC = MR). 
. a 
In Figure 20, the Paretian conditions are not satisfied at input 
lThe empirical problem of ascertaining values for MR is mini-
mized somewhat by existence of the following relationship: 
MR = P (1 + _1 ) 
x e 
where e = elasticity of demand with negative algebraic sign. Many 
economic questions can be answered only after estimates of demand 
functions have been made. The econometric techniques employed to 
estimate demand parameters also supply elasticity value s. Once price 
elasticities are available, computations of marginal revenue s is simple. 
The equilibrium condition in case 2 canthus be written: 
MPP P (l + ~) = P . 
a a ~ a 
• 
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level (0 - A ) even though the value of marginal product CO, A ) is paid 
o 0 
to A. A sufficient condition for an optimum would also require that 
employment not be restricted to the (0 - A ) level. The analogous 
: 0 
employment level under competition would be (0, AI). It is in the 
l3ense of restricted employment that the factors are exploited. (Question: 
Can the factors earn pure profits for the firm if they do receive wages 
equivalent to VMP ? If so, how much? ) 
a 
0 
P , MRP, VMP 
a 
MRP 
.a 
A 
0 
= MPP a 
MFC , W, P 
a a 
VMP = MPP 
a 
MR 
x 
I 
Al 
Figure 20. Productive services equilibrium: case 2. 
P 
a x 
A 
B 
Case 3: monopsony (factor) - competition (product). Equilibrium 
for the firm is shown at factor input (0, A ) in Figure 21. The marginal 
. 0 
factor cost of A (MFC ) must be set equal to VMP to maximize 
a a 
profits. 1 Benefit to the firm from using the marginal unit of A is the 
value of the marginal product, depicted as distance (A , Q) in Figure 21. 
. 0 
1From the previous footnote, MFC = P (1 +. E1 ) where E = 
a a 
elasticity of supply of factor A with a positive algebraic sign. 
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P, 
a 
VMP, 
a 
MFC 
a / 
1 
MEC , P a (l + E) 
/ A 
c:-A is worth this /much to firm / P a -----~-- Q . 
} 
Exploit,ation / / 
per unIt / 
/ 
- - - ;; / - - - - ,R I 
./ ~irm pays this much 
I for A on average 
I , 
o A 
o 
A 
B 
MPP A . P x :::; VMP A 
Figure 21. Productive services equilibrium: case 3 
Equilibrium for the firm cannot be efficient in the Paretian sense. 
The socially desirable employment level of A would require expansion 
to (0, AI). Since wage returns to A are (A
o
' R), the value (R, Q) 
is a measure of the price exploitation the factor be~r s due to existence 
of monopsony in the factor market (only a single purchaser of factors). 
Case 4: monopoly (product) - monopsony (fac~or). Equilibrium for 
the firm is still where MFC :::; MRP . 
t a a 
In this particular instance factor' 
exploitation is increased due to additional influence of Q. monopoly selling 
, .""''' .. 
market. Valu.e of output to society at leyel (0, Ao) is -(Ao' Pl. Wage 
payments to factors are only (A , R). (Figure 22) 
_ 0, 
If Paretian conditions could be fulfilled, production associated 
with (0, AI) inputs would be forthcoming and the return to A would 
equal the marginal sacrifice of factor effort. It is clear that competitive 
markets on both sides of the productive process 'ire a prerequisite to 
attainment of a Paretian optimum. 
P,W 
a 
MFCA 
per 
unit 
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MPf A • P x' VMP a 
P Ao 
o 
I 
----1--- MPPA . P (1 +-), MRP , x e a 
A 
o ~l 
Figure 22. Productive services equilibrium: case 4 
Labor as a Market Force 
A 
B 
Labor as an economic commodity will be examined in the same 
framework as that of other factor markets. What amount of labor, in 
equilibrium, will be offered at the going market rate? Four somewhat 
ficticious assumptions will be employed while examining this question: 
I, .J..abor can be supplied o~ a 21-hour basis. 
I 
2. There are no institutional impediments to the employment of 
I 
I 
labor. 
3. Perfect competition exists. 
4. Predictions can be made with certainty. 
Ip Flgure 23 consider the indifference curve for a given level of ' 
utility, U, relating total income and hours worked per week. This and 
o 
other indifference curve s can be constructed by connecting combination 
points pf hours and income that produce given levels of satisfaction. 
54 
Total 
income, 
I 
(dI/dh) - --2 
,,-
/ 
/ 
/ 
I U 2 I 
/ 
( dII dh) 
o 
U 
o 
o h 
.. I No. of hours worker per week, h 
Figure 23. Indifference curve for labor 
Indifference, U, 
o 
has a positive slope because more incentive is needed 
as the work week increases; the derivative of the slope is positive due 
to the increasing marginal disutility of work. 
If a certain wage rate is offered, it can be depicted by a linear 
function having slope (l/h) I as in Figure 23. The equilibrium point 
will be at P which is the point tangent to the highe st level of utility 
(U 1) for the curve. Thus, (0, hI) hours of labor will be offered at the 
market wage rate (l/h)l. Optimum hours of labor for an individual to 
supply are determined by an equality of the marginal rate of sub stitution 
of income for labor with the wage rate dll dh = l/h. 
In Figure 24 the effect of an increase in income has been plotted. 
Equilibrium moves from P to R. Again, as when the demand for 
cotnmoditie s was considered, the movement from P to R is the net 
result of two disparate tendencies. As wages rise there is some tendency 
to substitute earnings for labor; there is a tendency to move from P to 
Q. The "income effect" creates a tendency to move from Q to R. 
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Again, just as in the case of demand, the substitution effect is virtually 
certain to lead to positive increases (in hours). Due to the nece s sary 
slopes of indifference curves in the labor supply case, however, the 
chance that income effects will swamp out substitution effect!> is enormously 
increased. Thus, the net effect of a wage increase could be a reduction 
in labor offerings. 
Income 
Hours 
Figure 24. Income and substitution effects in a labor supply 
market 
If the locus of all possible points of tengency of indifference curves 
and various wage rates is drawn, a labor iupply curve will be defined. 
The shape of this function may be as showp in Figure 25. 
The general shape of the supply curve of Figure 25 indicates that 
leisure may be both inferior and superior, depending upon the level of 
income. Or, another interpretation can be made in terms of marginal 
utility. After a certain income plateau is reached, the marginal utility 
of income sharply declines, and the marginal disutility of labor increases. 
(Questions: What might happen to agricultural employment levels if a 
mipimum wage is enforced? What might union wage bargaining do to 
employment of members? Do union goals such as maximum employment, 
maximum wages per man, or maximum total union wage receipts have 
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I 
Hours 
Figure 25. Labor supply curve indicating influence of leisure 
as a superior good 
any bearfng on your answer?) 
Optimum supply of labor to numerous employers requires that 
(~) I 
dh n =h 
This can only be achieved in competitive markets, because only such 
markets force all labor suppliers to adjust to a common wage rate. 
.. 
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VII 
SUMMARY OF NECESSAR Y CONDITIONS FOR 
PARETIAN OPTIMUM 
1. In Consumption: 
dY 
n 
P 
x 
=-- = 
2. In Production: 
Product market - (Me ) = (Me ) = 
xl, x 2 
for all other products, Y, OZ, ••• M. 
Or, 
MPP 
ax 
= 
MPP 
ay = 
MPPby 
dX 
n 
P 
Y 
= (Me ) = P ; Also 
xn x 
MPP P 
an a 
= ~M~P"""P::-b-n- = P b . 
Factor market - PM = MPPM " P n for all factors. 
3. Factor Supply: 
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MRS between factor benefit and factor sacrifice must be equal for 
all suppliers of a given factor. 
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VIII 
KALDOR COMPENSATION CRITERION 
According to the Paretian criterion one can always increase welfare 
by moving toward the contract curve (within the confines of the indif-
ference curves passing through a position off the curve). Thus in the 
Edgeworth box diagram of Figure 26 there is no question that there is 
an increase in welfare in moving from point A to point E. since II is no 
worse off and I is better off. 
-x II 
i 
y y 
I X -
Figure 26. Logic of compensation criterion 
To compare A to F in Figure 26 is an income distribution problem. 
Kaldor (34, 35) suggested that any point on the contract curve is superior 
to any point off. Thus while II is worse off at F than at E, a series of 
compensating payments, x and y , from I to q will put I and II 
o 0 
back at.E (I still better off on U~) while the project! is able to operate at 
F. Therefore all positions on the contract curve are superior to positions 
off" if compensation is paid from gainers to losers. 
The Kaldor criterion leave s Paretian conditions stronger because 
they are satisfied at any point along the contract curve. 
IX 
GENERAL THEOR Y OF SECOND BEST 
Professors Lipsey and Lancaster (38) are responsible for the 
general theory of the second best. This states that a complete Paretian 
optimum require s fulfillment of all marginal conditions simultaneously; 
a constraint or imperfection in the economy which prevents fulfillment 
of one condition makes all other Paretian conditions no longer desirable 
even though they may be attainable. 
There are three negative corollaries to this theory as follows: 
1. There is no apriori way to judge between situations if there is 
a departure from the complete Paretian opti:mum. 
2. It is not true that a situation in which more but not all of the 
optimum conditions are fulfilled is more de sirable than a 
situation in which fewer are fulfilled. 
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3. In a situation where there are many constraints, the removal of 
one of the constraints which pushe s the economy closer to a 
Paretian optimum doe s not mean that welfare is improved or 
that it is not improved; the answer cannot be determined. 
Perhaps the best example of attaining a second best optimum might 
be found in times of less than full employment. If there is a lack of 
consumer demand or an institutional rigidity exists that re suIts in un-
employment, it may be desirable to reallocate employment until the 
marginal rate of substitution of labor for income is equal for both the 
! 
previously employed group and previously unemployed group. In Figure 
27, if A is the previously unemployed group and B is th~ employed 
group, it may increase the overall utility of both A and B by forcing, 
B to work fewer hours while A picks up the slack until the above 
criterion is satisfied. This will prevent group B from operating at its 
Paretian optimum, but group A is better off. 
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Income 
indifference curve 
wage rate 
A 
Hours of work 
Figure 27. Reallocation of work to satisfy second best 
optimum 
As a result of the appearance of the general theory ·of the second 
best there is some controversy over the assertion that Paretian optimums 
will produce economic efficiency. Actually mobility and degree of im-
perfections in the economy govern how much departure there is from a 
Paretian optimum. Whether an increase in welfare results as the 
economy approaches the Paretian condition cannot be predicted with 
certainty; the "fe"eling" that welfare will increase may only be 
intuitive. 
1 
.. 
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X 
FREE MARKET PHILOSOPHY AND THE PARETIAN OPTIMUM 
Milton Friedman (8) has argued strongly in favor of minimal govern-
mental interference in the economy. His thesis is that the mafket offers 
several distinct advantages over a command economy: 
1. In a voluntary exchange every individual believes he is better 
off than if someone else made the allocation. 
2. ThJ:lre is no coercion and t:berefore freedom is maximized. 
3. Th~ market offsets political power. 
4. The market can reduce the range of issues that need to be 
solved by political means--and the market does not require a 
cumbersome structure and overhead. 
5. Political action requires conformity, but the market may produce 
wide diversity. 
Many persons would feel, w~th respect to 2 that markets are not 
entirely free of coercion. Those who have experienced run-away in-
flation or live lives dominated by specific markets that cannot be avoided 
(certain labor markets in areas where labor mobility is virtually nil) 
are cases in point. And persons only receive the benefit of Friedman's 
fifth argument if they have the wherewithal to select meaningful alterna-
tives. Friedman discusses freedom in terms of absence of constraints 
(thereby leaving himself open to the charge of espousing a paradox). 
Economic constraints constitute a lack of freedom. Freedom needs a 
broader definition, such as in terms of the total number of alternatives 
to choose from. 
There are five general areas where government must function, ac-
cording to Friedman: 
1. Protection (from each other and from foreign natiops) 
2. To preserve law and order 
3. To enforce contracts 
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4. To foster competitive markets 
5. To help individuals accomplish jointly what may be difficult 
individually. 
A complete application of Friedman I s philosophy is impos sible 
due to the existence of three major classes of market imperfections: 
imperfect possession, imperfect foresight, and monopoly. 
Imperfect Possession 
Weak property rights. The beneficial use of many resources is 
threatened by theft, enticement, expropriation or other means. When 
such conditions are present, owners will ihvest short of the optimum. 
Unclear water laws may inhibit development due to uncertainty of future 
rights. The expectation that the federal government may continue to cut 
grazing permits on the public lands will likely reduce investment in 
range improvement practices below the optimal level. 
While recognizing that property rights are not God given, re spect 
for them tends to promote conservation. Conversely, strong drives for 
conservation may overturn property rights and be self-defeating. 
Fugitive resources. In many cases, resources are subject to 
private appropriation only if they can be captured, e. g., fish or precious 
minerals. The odds are that such situations lead to duplication of 
capture effort. In the case of oil, for example, there is inducement to 
over-rapid depletion and even reduction in total yield. The pattern of 
exploitation in the sea fisheries reveals how investment can get out of 
hand relative to reasonable expectations of success. Possibly the 
greatest recent example of flagrant overinvestment is provided by the 
fever in search and promotion activities accompanying the "Uranium 
Boom" of 1954. 
Neighborhood effects and externalities. These are unborn costs 
imposed by some resource users on others that do not get evaluated 
in the market. An example mentioned earlier is smoke and other air 
pollutants. ' Others are~ congestion mutually imposed by urban road 
users, or the deterioration of water quality caused by one group which 
increases social costs of re-use. 
Two features should stanp. out from these examples. 
1. Increased costs asso~iated with such external effects are 
technological. That is, additional costs must be borne by 
society in the form of production below what would otherwise 
be pos sible; 
2. The resour<:;es involved are treated by users as "common 
property." Actual use often takes place in an atmosphere 
of "If I don 't get it; someone else will. rT 
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In attempts to correct for certain external effects, the government 
(Friedman argues) tends to err as much as private markets do in 
ignoring their presence. He does concede that some government reg"u-
1ation may be desirable. 
Imperfect Foresight (Risk and Uncertainty) 
Social risk. Use and development of natural resource may turn 
out to be more or less valuable than expected. Therefore, on an ex 
post basis, such use may have been bad. But re"su1ts can go either way. 
The real question is whether private market decisions are any worse 
than government deci sions. 
If the resource in question is a small part of a private person's 
wealth, so that marginal utility of money is invariant if the asset is lost, 
there should be no difference in the rate of utilization between the 
social optimum and private optimum 
SOll1e argue in favor of government planning because the time 
horizon ~s purported to be longer. Private development need not be 
deficient in this respect. Corporations have a perpetual existence at 
stake, and private interests are often motivated to leave wealth to their 
posterity. 
64 
Private risk. Loss of possession through expropriation is a reason 
for government action. But other risks, according to S. Ciriacy-
Wantrup (5), are due to: I) irrationality; 2) extra-market value s; 3) 
uncertainty; and 4) habit patterns. Since (1) and (4) are not considered 
by Friedman, Wantrup's extensions are of some interest. 
By irrationality Wantrup means that private actions are not con-
sistent with private goals. -They do not reflect learning over time. 
Habit patterns are intertwined with irrationality. Similar actions are 
consistently repeated over time without recourse to rational thought 
processes. In this situation society might gain by government sponsored 
education, and policies designed to consel,"ve otherwise wasted reSources. 
Public vs. Private Sectors and Monopoly 
The most glaring deficiency of the private sector is limited 
objectives (most of which are tied to profits). Thus, externalitie s are 
often neglected: water and air pollution are prominent example s today. 
Some firms have begun to internalize externalities, however, because 
they recognize a responsibility to the public in addition to their re-
sponsibility to stockholders and employees. The government is more 
apt to consider externalities in its planning, but it can,be limited by 
its policies and bureaucratic structure. The Corps of Engineers in its 
zeal to promote flood control projects, and thus its own growth, is a 
good example. This type of weakness leaves open the question of 
whether government planning will promote greater overall utility than 
private planning. 
There are incentives for private firms to keep themselves in-
formed on a broad perspective, their economic life depends upon it. 
The market is better able to take care of inefficiencies than political 
processes, but monopoly may reduce the competitive pressures to weed 
them out. Despite oligopolistic growth, however, it is possible to argue 
that today's markets are even more competitive and less tolerant of 
• 
" 
economic inefficiency than ever before. Their comprehensiveness and 
the increased knowledge of both buyers and sellers have made them so . 
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There are situations where competition is not desirable, however. 
Where there are economies to scale and where needless duplication would 
result because of the natural situation (such as power transmis sion, 
telephone service, or railroads) then monopoly production should pre-
vail. In place of market force s some kind of government regulation and 
intervention is necessary to protect the public welfare. 
To summarize: when there is a common property resource, when 
monopoly exists, and when externalities are important. and if private 
enterprise is valued, then there must be some form of control. Beyond 
that it is open to que stion. Government intervention can only go so ,far 
without impairing the health of the private sector. 
Decentralization is better than centralization, other things equal. 
People have more flexibility to adjust or move if they do not like a 
situation. If large doses of monopoly appear some governmental inter-
vention in fostering private markets is necessary. Friedman argues that 
of the two, private monopoly is better than government because it is 
less likely to last over the long pull. 
PART II 
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XI 
GREEN BOOK (30) 
Motivation for Green Book 
In 1946 the Federal Interagency River Basin Committee appointed 
a subcommittee for the purpose of formulating mutually acceptable 
principles and procedures to determine benefits and costs for water 
re sources projects. The "Green Book" presents the conclusions and 
recommendations resulting from a series of studies by that sub-
committee. 
The series of studies upon which the Green Book is based was 
divided into the following major parts. 
A. Analysis of current practices in economic evaluation 
B. Objective analysis and analysis of special problems 
C. Conclusions and recommendations 
Comparison of then current practices among government 
agencies indicated important, fundamental differences in their concepts 
of economic evaluation. Agencies differed in such concepts as: 
1. Economic effects attributed to differences in measurement 
procedures 
2. Differences in the liberality with which costs were measured 
as compared with benefits. 
Section B was designed to provide a systematic, consistent, and 
theoretically sound framework for the economic analysis of river basin 
projects and programs irrespective of current practices or legislative 
and administrative limitations. 
Section C contained the recommended set of criteria for benefit-
cost analysis which participating agencies could employ to select 
those projects which would lead to most effective development of 
individual river basins. 
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Basic Assumptions and Principles 
Analysis in Chapter 2 proceeds from four main assumptions: 
1. The most" effective use of economic resources is made if they 
are utilized in such a way that the amount by which benefits 
exceed costs is at a maximum. (This criterion takes pre-
cedence over benefit-cost ratio or any other basis. ) 
2. A project should be designed to include each separable segment 
or increment of scale of development which will provide 
benefits at least equal to the cost of the segment Qr increment. 
3. The project, and any separable segment selected to accomplish 
a given purpose should be more. economical than any other 
alternative means, public or private, for accomplishing the 
purpose of that project. 
4. Economic analysis sho-uld provide data which can ultimately 
be used for arraying a number of justified projects in the 
order of their economic desirability. 
Basis for evaluation of benefits and costs. The Interagency 
Committee recognized the limitations inherent in reflecting public 
values solely in monetary measures but concluded that there is no 
other suitable framework for evaluating the effects of public works 
projects in common terms. Accordingly it was recommended that 
project effects were to be gauged in the light of market prices. In-
tangibles, such as scenic values, which are considered impossible or 
difficult to express in monetary terms, were to be considered and 
described in a way that would clearly indicate their importance and 
influence on project formulation and selection. 
Cost-benefit terminology. 
:project costs are the values of the goods and service s used for 
I 
the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the project. 
Associated costs are the values of the goods and services needed 
over and above those illcluded in the cost of the project itself to make 
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the immediate products or services of the project available for use or 
sale. 
Primary benefits are the value s of the immediate products or 
services resulting from the measures for which project costs and 
associated costs are incurred. 
Secondary costs are the values of any goods and services which 
are used on the cost side as a result of the project. These may be such 
things as the co sts of transporting wheat, elevator and milling costs, 
etc. 
Secondary benefits are the values added over and above the values 
of immediate products or services ,of the project as a result of activities 
stemming from or induced by the project. 
Primary and secondary benefits. Individual projects should be 
credited with the difference between total primary benefits and benefits 
that could be expected to be realized by applying the as sociated co sts 
for other purposes if the project were not undertaken. Benefits fore-
gone are, in the usual case, assumed to be equal to the market value 
of the goods and services used. Therefore, the primary benefits at-
tributable to a project are equal to the total primary benefits less 
as sociated co st s. 
No secondary benefits are attributable to the project unless it can 
be shown that there is an increase in such benefits as a result of the 
project as compared with conditions to be expected in the absence of the 
project. Secondary benefits can accrue, for example, under the follow-
ing conditions: 
1. Goods and services equivalent to the project surplus can be 
made available to secondary activities at less cost than would 
have been possible in the absence of the project. 
2. Net secondary benefits may be creditable to projects when 
it is expected that goods or services used in activities 
stemming from or, induced by the project would have lower 
use value in the absence of the project. 
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3. Secondary activitie s can obtain the project surplus without an 
increase in market price. 
Suppose that project produced "surplus" or additional wheat could 
be made available to millers at the prevailing market price of $2. 00 per 
bushel. If conditions were such that in the absence of the project 
equivalent additional production of wheat by other means would have to 
be sold to millers at $2.10 to cover cost$, a benefit of 10 cents per 
surplus bushel would be credited to the project. 
Economic limitations on scale of project development. This 
section considers implications for project scale s resulting from a 
decision to maximize the benefit-cost rati,?, rather than to maximize the 
difference between benefits and costs, or to equate total benefits and, 
total costs. There is a rather clear reference to the principle that 
total benefits exceed total costs by a maximum where marginal cost 
equals marginal return, and that this is the best scale. 
In cbmparing relative economic value of justified projects, the 
ratio of benefits to costs reflects both benefit and cost values and is 
the recommended basis for ranking projects. (The process of formu-
lating sU,ch ratios can be very tricky evert in cases where the required 
original'investm~nt in alternative projects is equal. See Appendix 
on thi s point. ) 
Measurement of Benefits and Costs 
Chapter 3 takes up pric:e levels, interest rates, risk allowances, 
period of analysis, particular problems of measurement (including 
treatment of tangibles and intangibles), adjustments for levels of 
economic activity, costs of affected public facilities, acquisition of 
land, and improvements, taxes, displaced facilities, extension of use-
ful life, and consequential damages. 
The most convenient and widely recognized basis for compq.risons 
of benefits with costs is the ,monetary unit, but to make these equivalent 
1-
, 
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on a time basis discounting and adjustments for price levels are necessary. 
Price levels. Measurements should be concerned with real costs 
and benefits. Real costs to society if resources are used for project 
construction is measured by the amount of other goods and services for 
which such re source s could be exchanged at the time when they are to 
be used. Similarly for benefits. (Unless expected benefits will command 
more goods and resources ·..than represented by project costs the cost-
benefit ratio will be less than unity, regardless of monetary values 
exhibited by the ratio. Future monetary values must be corrected for 
expected purchasing power.) The problem is that no one can foresee 
what future price levels will be. It is suggested that the most satis-
factory approach would require use of prices estimated as they are 
expected to be at the time when costs are incurred and benefits received. 
As a practical matter this would mean applying prices, current at the 
time of investigation, to project investment costs (assuming the latter 
are to be incurred shortly after project authorization). Benefits and 
other costs would be expressed in terms of the best judgment of price 
levels expected to prevail at the time when these benefits and costs 
materialize. (In a sense the suggested procedure amounts to utilization 
of an average expected price level. But it is obvious that in a situation 
where inflation is the general rule that this will grossly overstate benefits 
compared to costs since the greater proportion of the benefits come in the 
future when price levels are inflated. In the 1958 edition deflation for 
upward price level changes is advocated.) Various price projections by 
agencies of government might be used, with application of special ad-
justments to the section of the country where the project is planned if 
prices are consistently on one side of the national average in that 
locality. 
Interest rates, discounting, and risk allowances. Values attached 
to benefits and costs at the time of accrual can be made comparable only 
through conversion to an equivalent basis for time and degree of certainty 
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of occurrence. Discounting and risk allowance provide a means for 
giving monetary expre s sion to difference s in the time and certainty of 
occurrence of benefits and costs. 
In established :money markets, interest rates for loans and invest-
ments reflect both time and risk elements. Adjustment for risk takes 
acrount of the hazards and uncertainties that intervene between the com-
mitment or investment of respurces and the accrual of benefits. (The 
difference between risk and uncertainty is explained and the statement made 
that risk allowance be governed by appropriate factors; reflections for un-
certai.nty must be based on judgments. ) 
Regarding discounting, it is argued that the intere st rate on invest-
ments such as long-term government bonds would appear to be a reason-
ably satisfactory measure of the interest return with minimum risk 
opportunities available for capital inve stment. (The 1958 edition sugge sts 
that risk allowance on government projects be similar to that prevailing 
in similar private projects.) Although such a rate may not fully reflect 
a justifiable preference of society for present goods, it still provides a 
measure of the yield of other opportunities for capital investment that are 
foregone by society if resources are invested in government projects. It 
is freely admitted that there may be risks in government projects that do 
not get reflected in the government borrowing ra~e; nevertheless, the 
. Committee advocates use of the government borrowing rate, which was 
2 1/2 percent in 1950. (They continue to suggest use of the government 
rate in 1958, rounded to the nearest one-fourth of one percent. ) 
Period of analysis. The Committee makes a distinction between 
economic and physical life. Physical depreciation, obsolescence, changing 
requirements for project services, and time d~scount in allowances for risk 
and uncertainty may limit the present value of future project services. The 
econoIY)ic life of a project is determined by the point in time at which the 
effect of the foregoing factors is to cause· the costs of continuing the project 
to exceed the additional benefits to be expected from continuation. The 
.. 
75 
economic life is generally Ie s s than the physical life of the project and is 
never more than the estimated physical life. 
It is recommended that the period of analysis of 100 years be 
considered as the upper limit on economic life. If it is known that the 
expected economic life of the project is less than 100 years, the actual 
estimates should be used. 
Measurement Problems 
Treatment of tangible and intangible effects. Tangible effects of a 
project are defined as tho se measurable in monetary terms, and the 
intangible effects are those which cannot be measured in monetary terms. 
Some tangible effects cannot be evaluated directly on the basis of market 
prices, but their values may, in some cases, be derived or estimated 
indirectly from price s established in the market for similar or 
analogous effects. 
Intangible effects need to be described with care and should not be 
overlooked or minimized merely because they do not yield a dollar evalu-
ation. (It is interesting that recreation and wildlife are placed in this 
category. ) 
Adjustments for levels of economic activity. During times when 
labor and other economic resources are fully employed, market prices 
of construction resources represent an adequate measure of the value of 
benefits foregone. But during times of relatively low economic activity 
construction resources lack alternative uses. This situation may warrant 
adjustment of the usual market price evaluation of project costs. (As 
long as unemployment is a cyclical phenomenon, attempting to make ad-
justments in data would be the same as trying to out-guess the business 
cycle. Have to assume full employment in long-run.) 
Due to the practical difficultie s of summing up the numerous factor s 
involved, it is sugge sted that the advantageous effects of the use of un-
employed labor in public works can be approximated by estimating the 
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reduction in unemployment compensation or relief payments made pos-
sible if the project is undertaken. The necessary adjustment could be 
made by decreasing project costs or increasing project benefits by this 
amount. (This could not be a correct procedure unless it could be as sumed 
that relief payments are an accurate measure of the social usefulne ss of 
the resources. ) 
Treatment of costs of affected public facilitie s. Project cost for 
acquiring privately owned land and property should include both the 
market price to be paid for the property plus the discounted value of any 
annual payments on bonded indebtedness, if any, applicable to that 
property on account of public facilities. 
Acquisition of land improvements. When land and improvements 
are acquired for project purposes the acquisition costs including legal 
fees and administrative expeonses are normally included as project costs. 
Treatment of taxes. There are two aspects of tax receipts that 
need special consideration in the economic analysis of proposed projects: 
1. Changes in tax revenues of local government units affected by 
the project which are not fully balanced by changes in govern-
mental expenses of the same units. 
2. The effect of taxes on the value of benefits that could be ob-
tained for the same cost from an alternative source (as in the 
case of electric power). 
A tax adjustment problem arises when an adversely affected taxing 
district cannot benefit from the increased tax returns in other areas 
which may have their tax basis raised by a project. 
When market prices are used to evaluate project benefits, the 
Green Book suggests the following: 
To the extent that taxes are reflected in the market 
prices of goods and services, such taxes, whether on in-
come or property, will have been considered in estimating 
the value of goods and services produced by water re-
source development projects. No deductions for taxes 
.. 
in market prices should be made since this would reduce 
the value of benefits below the actual appraisal of the 
market as indicated by consumers' preferences or 
willingne s s to pay. 
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(Thus the project costs should include all increases in costs of 
governmental services resulting from the project. Advantageous effects 
such as an increase in the net property tax revenue s should be deducted 
as an offset from as sociated costs. When the benefits of a federal 
project are evaluated on the basis of the cost of producing similar 
products from an alternative private source, the estimate of private 
costs should include taxes that would be payable. ) 
Displaced facilities. Displaced facilities are those whose present 
use is abandoned because the project facilities provide essentially the 
same purposes. It is recommended that the value of services that 
would have resulted from displaced facilities less their operation and 
maintenance costs should be subtracted from the total value of project 
services of the same kind to determine benefits attributable to the 
project. 
Extension of useful life. A project may have the effect of ex-
tending the useful life of a non-project structure or facility. The 
benefit creditable to a project for such extension of life is the difference 
in the net value of goods or service s provided by the affected facility 
with and without the life extending measure s. Such benefits may be 
measured in terms of the value of the increased goods or services pro-
vided or in terms of reduced costs of providing such goods or services. 
Consequential damages. Consequential damages are uncompensated 
losses resulting directly from a project and should be a part of the pro-
ject development costs. 
Cost Allocation for Multiple Purpose Projects 
Most of the material in the latter chapters of the Green Book is 
simply a summary of how these procedure s can be related to the various 
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functional areas of water resource development such as irrigation, power, 
flood control, etc. Only chapter 6 will be reviewed here because it 
contains interesting views on project cost apportionment. Cost alloca-
tion is the process of apportioning project costs among the various 
purpose s served by the project. The objective of cost allocation is to 
distribute project costs equitably among the purposes served. 
The" separable costs - -remaining benefits" method of cost alloca-
tion is supposed to provide an equitable distribution of the costs of a 
multiple purpose project among the purpose s served. The method consists 
of 
1. Determining the separable costs 9f including each function in 
the multiple purpose project. 
2. Determining an equitable distribution of costs incurred for 
several purposes in common. 
Separable cost for each project purpose is the difference between 
the cost of the multiple purpose project and the cost of the project with 
the purpose omitted. In effect, separable costs are computed from a 
series of project cost estimates, each representing the multiple purpose 
project with one purpose omitted. 
Residual costs are defined as the difference between the cost of too 
multiple purpose project as a whole and the total of the separable costs 
for all project purposes. Residual costs thus represent a remaining 
joint cost attributable to all or several purposes. From total benefits 
for each purpose separable costs are deducted to give l"emaining benefits, 
then residual costs are distributed in proportion to the remaining benefits 
for each purpose. The distribution of residual costs in proportion to the 
excess of benefits over separable costs assigns to each purpose an 
equitable share of project savings. 
(Assuming that project BIC ratios are above unity, this method 
implie s that separable costs give rise to benefits on a 1: 1 basis while 
re sidual costs mUi>t give benefits greater than 1: 1. One might argue 
'1 
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that those people who receive the most benefits should in fact pay the 
highest proportion of the costs. In fact, this is what taxes based on 
ability-to-pay amount to. The procedure is equivalent to taxing away 
the rent on intramarginal resources of all kinds in order to make net 
returns equal. Intuitively, this may seem to be just, but the procedure 
is arbitrary and has no strong economic rationale. ) 
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XII 
BUDGET CIRCULAR A-47 (29) 
B ackgrollnd 
An executive order re((~jtring cost-benefit estimate s to be placed 
before the Bureau of the Budget for review has existed since 1943. The 
succeeding decade was marked by conflict between the executive branch 
and Congress. Finally, on the last day of the Truman administration, 
Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47 was issued (December 31, 1952). 
It was hoped that the suggested standards and procedures would 
encourage 1) priorities for projects yield~ng the greatest value to the 
nation, and 2) effective resource development at minimum necessary 
cost. 
The Circular set forth standards and procedurel3 to be used by 
the executive branch in reviewing proposed water resource project 
reports and budget estimates submitted in accordance with existing 
requirements. While the aim was to encourage adoption of more uni-
form agency policies and standards, it was specifically noted that dif-
ferences of opi.nion among the agencies would continue. The Circular 
nei ther meant to re strict the content of agency reports nor to determine 
the position which agencies might take with respect to substantive issues. 
The Circular contains a rather long list of definitions for "project, " 
"program, " II benefits, " "primary benefits, " "secondary benefits, " all 
of which follow the lines established by the Green Book. "Economic 
costs" are defined to include all of the financial costs of the program 
excepting investigating, surveying, and planning costs incurred prior 
to authorization, and all other identifiable expenses, and liabilities 
which are incurred as a result of constructing, operating, or maintaining 
a prograrp. or project. "Financial costs" include all of the monetary 
outlays made in connec~ion with the program or project and interest 
costs connected therewith. (When applied to irrigation, financial costs 
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shall not include intere st on the irrigation construction cost.) "Con-
struction costs, " "operation and maintenance costs, II "net revenue s, II 
and "reclamation'l are defined along conventional lines. 
Information for Inclusion in Project Reports 
The following categories of information are :required in the 
project reports. A description of the need for the production or services 
that would result from the project. A concise but complete estimate of 
all the benefits and all of the economic costs of undertaking the program 
or project. (Wherever appropriate benefits and economic costs shall 
be expressed in monetary te:rms.) All data relating to the financial 
feasibility and to the allocation and reimbur sement of finan~ial costs 
prepared in accordance with the standards set forth. (This shall include 
the net effect of the project on the federal treasury.) The source, nature, 
and adequacy of the basic information available and used during the pre-
paration of the proposal. 
Estimates should be made from an overall, public, or national 
viewpoint. Unless benefits exceed costs the project will not, in the 
usual case, be justified. 
Benefits to be Included 
Without clear justification for considering other factors, review of 
project reports will emphasize the following categorie s of primary 
benefits: 
1. Reduction of flood damage. 
2. Increases in the expected net income obtained directly from 
changed use of the property made possible by any form of 
flood control. 
3. Increases in the expected net income from lands on which 
watershed treatment measures a:re to be installed. 
4. Increase in expected net farm income. 
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5. Transportation savings resulting from: 
The differential between the expected costs Of movement 
by non-water transport and costs of movement by water for 
those comITJ.odities which will be carried by land transport 
if the project is not built. 
Traffic which will not move without the waterway improve-
ment, but which will move by water if the project is built. 
Whether the project improves an already navigable water-
way. 
6. Direct benefits of shore protection. 
7. Direct benefits from harbor improvements. 
8. Electrical energy to be produced. This value is to be computed 
by the lowe st of two figur e s: 
The cost of equivalent energy from the cheapest alterna-
tive source of energy. 
The value of power to users considered as the highe st 
price they would pay and applicable where the cost of alterna-
. tive power would be prohibitive for particular users. 
9. Value of municipal, inqustrial, and domestic water supply to 
• I be furmshed valued by the equivalent of the cheapest alterna-
tive source. 
10. Increases in the value of recreation and fish and wildlife as 
a result of the project. The position taken is that these are 
not usually subject to measuremert in monetary terms. 
11. Savings in the cost of water treatment or gains in the value of 
streams for industrial, municipal, and domestic water supply. 
Evaluations must include an estimate of any secondary benefits 
which the program or project would provide; total primary and total 
secondary benefits should be shown separately however. Until standards 
and procedures for measuring secondary benefits are approved by tlle 
Bureau of the Budget, evaluation should be based mainly upon primary. 
benefit s. 
j. 
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Costs to be Included 
Production evaluation shall also include a statement of economic 
costs expected to be induced by the program or project such as the cost 
of: 
1. Displacement of people. 
2. Decreased value of lands, minerals, etc., that are not re-
flected in market values. 
3. Rectifying adverse effects upon sanitation, transportation, 
highway construction, or maintenance, etc. 
4. Business losses such as disruption of trade or diversion of 
waterborne traffic from existing ports or channels. 
5. Losses in state or local tax revenues. 
6. Unprevented and uncompensated losses of or damages to fish 
and wildlife resources, recreation resources, etc. 
7. Abandonment of economically useful structures such as box 
bridges. 
Each evaluation shall also include an appraisal of other detriments to 
the general welfare whether or not they can be measured in monetary 
terms. 
The cost of facilities or features of the program or project used 
only for a single purpose of water resource development shall be al-
located to the respective purposes served by such facilities ~r features. 
The cost of facilities or features of a program or project used jointly 
shall be allocated among the purposes served in such a way that each 
purpose will share equitably in the savings, resulting from combining 
the purposes. 
There are SOme minor rules about allocation costs to fish and 
wildlife benefits and handling costs of pollution control or abatement. 
Section 13 requires identification of that portion of financial costs 
to be borne by the federal government and a statement as to whether 
or not they will be reimbursed. 
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Length of Repayment Peri·ad 
The length of life is confined to 50 years or less and reimburse-
ment must be made within this period. 
Determination of Inte:re st Ra.te on Federal Inve stment 
The discount rate to be used is the average rate of intere st payable 
by the Treasury on interest·;.:>ec.ring marketable securities of the United 
State s outstanding at the end of the fiscal year preceeding such computa-
tion. The actual rate used shall be the nearest one-eighth of one percent 
below the computed average 'lcd.ne. 
Additional Requirements 
Reclamation projects may be allowed an additional ten years beyond 
fifty for repayment if necess3.ry. Where the cost allocated to irrigation 
is in excess of the sum of the anticipated repayment by the water users 
and other identifiable i:r:dg;don beneficiaries, the project report shall 
identify these excess costs and may propose that they be borne by the 
federal government as a subsidy to irrigation. (Interest subsidy to 
irrigation is over and above this general subsidy area. ) 
Recreation potential shall be given full consideration. However, 
the financial costs of these aspects shall be U:"eated as a non-reimbursable 
federal expense. 
Municipal and indust::id water supply augmentation is to be con-
sidered primarily a local and s'i:ate responsibility. Therefore these 
governmental units should reimburse the federal government for develop-
ment costs. 
SUlTImary 
It is clear th2.'I: this is a more conservative document than the 
Green Book in many ::oespects. The Circular limits the period of 
project life to 50 yeaTS, which at low interest rates may be of great 
:1 
-' 
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significance. Secondary benefits are virtually ignored in demonstrating 
project feasibility. 
(However, it is fair to say that there was sufficient latitude 
in the requirements of the Circular such that none of the agencies felt 
that they had to take it seriously. That this situation could not last was 
made clear by the appearance of Senate Document 97. ) 
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XIII 
SENATE DOCUMENT 97 (28) 
Motivation for Document 
On May 15., 1962, President Kennedy approved for application by 
the Agencies of the Executive Branch {including the Bureau of the Budget} 
a. new set of evaluation standa.rds as unanimously recommended by the 
Secretaries of Defense, Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education, 
and Welfare. 
The new policie s and standards replaced Budget Bureau Circular 
A-47 which had caused considerable contention both as to content and as 
to the propriety of its SOUTee. In order that the Senate and citizens 
th:roughout the nation might be fu.lly informed of the accomplishment, 
Senator Anderson submitted il :resolution to have the new set of standards 
printed as a Senate DocUInent. 
The document is significant in that it represents an attempt by 
the Executive B:!.oanch, including the BUTeau of the Budget, and the 
Legislative Branch to get together on evaluation procedures. These 
must be uniformly applied by t~e various agencie s in the formulation 
and review of comprehensive river basin plans and individual project 
plans for use in development of water and related land resources. 
Any deviation from the poHcies and standards in the documents must be 
delineated in the planning reports. 
Objective s of Planning 
Development of each region within the country is essential to the 
maintenance of national stTength and the achievement of satisfactory 
levels of living. The document contains a long list of purposes and 
service swhich could be provided by p:r.oject construction and which 
would foster regional development. 
In a paragraph on p:reservation it is stated that resources must be 
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protected and rehabilitated to insure their availability for best use when 
needed. 
The well-being of all of the people shall be the overriding deter-
minant. Hardship and particular needs of particular groups within the 
general public shall be of concern, but care shall be taken to avoid 
resource use and development for the benefit of the few or the dis-
advantage of many. 
Whether there is a bias toward income distribution objectives as 
opposed to efficiency considerations cannot be ascertained with certainty. 
Both seem to be stressed in different places. 
Planning Policie s and Procedure s 
National, regional, state, and local viewpoints. All viewpoints, 
national, regional, state, and local must be fully considered when 
planning resource use and development. Significant departures from a 
national viewpoint required to accomplish regional, state, or local 
objectives shall be set forth in planning reports by those charged with 
their preparation. (There seems to be little recognition of the tre-
mendous problems that are involved when one looks at a project at 
various political levels. As an example, secondary benefits can almost 
be neglected if one take s national viewpoint. From the state or local 
level, such benefits may be very important determinants of project 
feasibility. From a national viewpoint there is little difference in the 
amount of economic rent resources can command whether used in 
w~stern reclamation projects or in public or private works in the East. 
At the local level, all construction inputs originating outside the region 
are viewed as additions to the immediate economy with the potential to 
generate secondary benefits. ) 
Multiple purpose planning. This is a statement of the various 
benefits from resource use that must be considered in planning. 
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River basin planning. Authors of the document contend that river 
basins are usually the most appropriate geographical units for planning 
the use and development of water and related land resources. On this 
scale of planning advantage s of multiple use, reconcilliation of com-
petitive uses, coordination of mutual responsibilities of different agencies 
and levels of government, and the intere sts of other s concerned with 
re source use can be optimally realized. (This is a very important 
point. The present watershed program, for example, is faulty in that 
it looks at only a portion of a river basin. The externalities involved 
tend to get negler.:ted. Also, project development is dependent upon 
local initiative and financing. It is probable that at the planning level, 
the integrated river basin orientation is the most sensible one. ) 
A section is included which covers coordination within the federal 
agencies and with non-federal interests. Instructions are given that 
federal planning must be carried out on a coordinated basis and that all 
agencies having any interest or responsibility should be brougpt into the 
discussions. (This will be an important contribution if in fact the 
agencies do cooperate. ) 
Standards for Formulation and Evaluation of Plans 
Normally, formulat1.on and evalua.tion of plans shall be based on 
expectation of an expanding national economy. Thus, increasing amounts 
of goods and service s a:re likely to be required to meet the needs of a 
growing population, higher levels of living, new international commitments, 
and continuing economic growth. (This is a more sensible statement on 
this is sue than appears in the other documents. ) 
Formulation and evaluation of plans or alternative plans shall be 
accomplished in a manner that will permit timely application of 
standards appropriate to conditions of I) les s than full employment 
nationally, and 2) chronic and persistent unemployment or under-
employment in disignated areas. Under these conditions project benefits 
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shall be adjusted upward by the value of labor and other resources 
required for project construction and expected to be used in project 
operation, project maintenance, and other additions to area employment 
during the life of the project. Adjustment should be made to the extent 
that such labor and other resources would, in the absence of the project, 
be unutilized or underutilized. Resulting additional benefits should be 
clearly identified as redevelopment benefits for the purpose s of cost 
allocation, cost sharing procedures, and to indicate their significance 
for project justification. (This is an important breakthrough. ) 
A broad public viewpoint must consider all effects: beneficial 
and adverse, short range and long ·range, tangible and intangible, etc. 
When there are major differences among technically feasible plans 
which are favorably evaluated from the standpoint of intangible benefits 
and costs in comparison with optimum plans based on tangible benefits 
and costs, the alternative combinations of projects within a river basin 
or alternative projects giving expression to these major differences 
shall be planned. (In this way intangible costs and benefits are sup-
posedly capable of being handled. ) 
Secondary benefits associated with the national viewpoint shall 
be combined with primary benefits when computing benefit-cost ratios. 
Secondary benefits attributable to projects from a regional, state, or 
local viewpoint shall also be evaluated when this procedure is expected 
to yield significant values. In this case, an additional benefit-cost 
ratio is computed to allow for secondary benefits. A description must 
be provided of the area in which the study takes place, its resources, 
markets, transportation, climate, social factor s, etc. 
Standards for formulation of plans. Plans should be formulated 
with due regard to all pertinent benefits and costs, both tangiple and 
intangible. Benefits and costs shall be expressed in comparable 
quantitative economic terms to the fullest extent possible. Comprehensive 
plans shall be formulated initially to include all units and purpose s which 
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satisfy the following criteria: 
1. Tangible benefits should exceed project economic costs. 
2. Each separable unit or purpose should provide benefits at 
least equal to its cost. 
3. The scope of development should be such as to provide maximum 
net benefits. 
4. There should not be a more economical means of accompli.shing 
the objectives of the plan. 
Project scale. Net benefits are maximized when the scope of 
development is extended to the point where the benefits added by the 
last increment of scale are equal to the costs. 
Definitions of benefits. The discussion of tangible, intangible, 
pritnary, and secondary benefits is comparable to that of the Green 
Book. Primary benefits include benefits to domestic, municipal, and 
industrial water supply, irrigation, water quality control, land 
stabilization, drainage, recreation, and fish and wildlife. Criteria used 
to measure these qenefits generally are the same. Market prices should 
be utilized. If price data are unavailable, the amount users should be 
willing to pay for the services in lieu of foregoing them is used. If 
this is impossible, the measure of the benefit will be approximated by 
the cost of achieving the same results by the most likely alternative 
means that would b~ utilized in the ab sence of the project. (There are 
I 
many questions raised by these suggestions: Are the authors hinting 
at the use of consum.ers' surplus? What happens to prices where the 
supply of benefits is sub stantially increased? The notion of comparing 
alternative costs is clearly wrong; the nearest alternatives are mostly 
high cost options. Use of such costs opens the door to enormous 
inflation of benefit claims. In the case of recreation and fish and wild-
life benefits, it is possible to corppare the costs of private alternative 
sources because many such alternatives are quite analogous; that is, 
alte:rnatives may be close substitutes. ) 
91 
Definitions of costs. Economic costs, installation costs, operation, 
maintenance, replacement costs, induced costs, associated costs, and 
taxes are all discussed and defined. None of this differs significantly 
from similar discussions in the Green Book. 
Period of analysis. Period of analysis should be the shorter of 
either the physical life or the economic life of the structure, facility, 
or improvement. However, because it is difficult to predict remote 
future conditions, 100 years will normally be considered the upper 
limit on the period of analysis. 
Discount rate. The rate to be used is the average rate of interest 
payable by the Treasury on interest-bearing marketable securities of 
the United States Government (outstanding at the end of the fiscal year 
preceeding such computation which, upon original issue, had terms to 
maturity of 15 years or more). The calculated value will be adjusted 
to the next lower multiple of one-eighth of one percent as necessary. 
Price levels. Prices used for project evaluation should reflect 
\ 
exchange value s expected to prevail at the time costs and benefits are 
realized. Estimates of initial project costs should be based on price 
relationships prevailing at the time of the analysis. Estimate s of 
benefits and deferred costs should be made on the basis of projected 
normal price relationships expected with a stabilized general price 
level and under relatively full employment conditions for the economy. 
Whenever a project benefit is expected to influence prices significantly, 
the use of a price about midway between those expected with and without 
the project may be justified to reflect the public values involved. 
(Refer to the Castle, Kelso, and Gardner article for this argument 44. ) 
Relation of Senate Document 97 to Cost Allocation, 
Reimbursement, and Cost Sharing Policy 
Standards and Procedure 5 
While cost allocation, reimbursement, and cost sha~ing policies 
are not treated explicitly, it is expected that they will be dealt wi.th 
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in the same manner as previously until a future instruction can be 
di stributed. 
Supplement No. 1 to Senate Document 97 --
Evaluation Standards for Primary 
Outdoor Recreation Benefits 
The role of recreation in the economic scheme. Evaluation of 
outdoor recreation must recognize that such services have values for 
which people are willing to pay. An accounting of relative returns from 
the use of resources for recreation versus other project purposes must 
be made in decisions affecting resource use. (This is an excellent 
statement and shows how recreation has moved from the intangible 
category into its own as an economic good. ) 
Categories of benefits. Direct expenditures by recreationists on 
project services are usually only a part of total expenditures. There-
fore, allowance must be made for costs of associated services in order 
to determine net recreation benefits attributable to individual projects. 
Overall intangible benefits associated with the protection of wild 
or primitive areas, areas of unique beauty, areas of scenic, historic, 
and pcientific interest, and the preservation of rare species and their 
habitat are considered to be an addition to the recreation value s en-
cornpas sed. 
The standard unit of use consists of a visit by ope individual to a 
recreation development or area for recreation purposes during any 
reasonable portion or all of a 24 hour period. General activities and 
specialized recreation project activities are differentiated. The general 
category includes most warm water fishing, swimming, picnicking, hiking, 
sight-seeing, most small game hunting, nature studies, tent and trailer 
camping, marine pier, and party boat fishing, water skiing, scuba diving, 
motor bOating, sailing, and canoeing in placid waters. In the specialized 
category are cold water fishing, upland bird and water fowl hunting, 
spe cialized nature photography, big game hunting, wilderness pack trips, 
white water boating and canoeing, and long range cruising in areas of 
outstanding scenic environment. 
Schedule of monetary unit value s for tangible benefits. A single 
unit value will be assigned per recreation day regardless of whether 
the estimated numbers of users engage in one activity or several. 
For the general type of outdoor recreation day, values ranging from 
50 cents to $1. 50 will be credited to the project. Specialized outdoor 
recreation days require credit from $2 to $6. 
Pending the development of improved pricing and benefit 
evaluation techniques, uniformity in the treatment of recreation in the 
planning of projects and programs and in cost allocations will be 
accomplished through the application of unit values that reflect the 
consensus judgment of qualified technicians. The unit values set forth 
herein are intended to approximate the amount that the users should' 
be willing to pay for recreation resources if such payments were re-
quired to avail themselves of the recreation. (In contrast with re-
imbursable costs, "payments" are hypothetical. ) 
Unit values selected are to be considered net of all associated 
costs, for both the users and others, in utilizing or providing the 
project resources and related services. Thus they are taken to be 
comparable with the benefits for other project purposes. 
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For general recreation purposes the lower end of pos sible costs 
should be used where facilities would be capable of supporting only 
casual visitation. The middle and upper values of possible costs should 
be assigned if projects are expected to provide diversified opportunities, 
or if the facilities for a limited number of activities are to be unusually 
well developed and maintained. 
In the specialized area, expensive or low density use and develop-
ment should be assigned values in the higher end of the $2 - $6 scale. 
Big game hunting and wilderness pack trips are examples. Activities 
to which values of the lower end of the high range should be assigned 
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might include upland bird hunting and specialized nature photography. 
This constitutes what is called primary criteria. 
Secondary criteria are set forth which relate to quality of the 
specific services. For example, a reservoir that is expected to carry 
a relatively heavy load of suspended silt or expected to be used beyond 
optimum capacity would be less desirable and therefore of lower unit 
value than one that will have clear water and be less crowded. Also, 
the degree to which alternative non-project opportunities are available 
to recreationists should also be considered in this assignment of values. 
Higher values should be assigned if the population to be served does not 
have existing water oriented recreation opportunities. {Therefore 
demand relative to supply in addition to quality constitute s the secondary 
criteria. } 
Finally, when intangible recreation consideration". are found to 
exist for a proposed project, the evaluation report will include: 
1. A narrative discus sion of the significance of intangible 
characteristic s involved. 
2. An estimate of the increase in project cost to provide in-
tangible recreation benefits. 
3. An estimate of the reduction in net benefits from other project 
purposes in order to accommodate recreation intangibles. 
The Supplement calls for more research to determine recreation 
uses, in estimating recreation values, and in assessing some of the 
interrelationships of recreational use s of re source s. 
XIV 
CONFLICTS IN COST-BENEFIT CALCULATIONS 
During recent years, a number of economists have presented 
arguments in favor of various revisions in public works evaluation 
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procedures. (6, 10, 12, 16, 21). However, not all the suggested 
revisions are harmonious and if followed could lead to widely varying 
levels of social benefit from given public expenditure. 
Economic Implications of Certain Scale Criteria 
In general, it can be stated that a project or set of projects scaled 
to yield a maximum benefit-cost ratio will simultaneously maximize 
average internal rate of return; the same project driven or enlarged 
to the size yielding a maximum difference between benefits and costs 
will equate the marginal internal rate of return with the going rate for 
inve stment funds. (13) 
In Figure 28 these possibilities are displayed in a fashion that 
emphasizes the economic implications of the choice of one criterion 
rather than another. If all production and investment were confined to 
the private sector, and if competition extended in all directions then, in 
the long run, intere st rate (r l) would prevail. Under these conditions, 
the various scale criteria would all lead to the same result. 
[Ouestions: In terms of the "stages of production" what does the 
dictum "maximize the cost-benefit ratio" suggest? Can any general 
conclusions about production levels and production inputs be drawn from 
the above results? Is there a "Paretian" result possible in Figure 28? 
Suppose there is perfect competition in the public sector but the govern-
:ment feels that a "social" rate (lower than the :market rate) shottld be 
used to evaluate public works projects--would there be a divergence of 
the criteria from the P max intersection 
a 
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Figure 28. Four investment scale criteria. Source: See Appendix 
Scale Criteria and Finances 
Whether it is more rational to attempt to maximize benefits over 
costs or their difference hinges upon the availability of capital. Where 
funds are the limiting factor, maximization of the benefit-cost ratio 
is appropriate and vice versa. (13; p. 33n, p. 42) 
'The extensive literature treating the rationed situation is the 
result of an implicit acceptance of the notion that sizes of individual 
projects are fixed by engineering or technological factors. The 
.. 
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immediate consequence is that ac'ljustment of project scales to accomplish 
the maximization of B/ Cis not a consideration. The sole question there-
fore is how to order the spending of public works budgets upon ltfixed-
sized" alternatives. Poised in this context:. the ranking calculations 
are not straightforward. Numerous anomolies crop up according to 
the method chosen for displaying cost-benefit calculations. This in 
turn gives rise to disagreement over the most satisfactory display 
procedure. 
Similar disag:reement is absent in the case where funds are 
imagined to be unrationed. All authors who have given attention to this 
latter situation accept as correct the investment criterion to maximize 
the difference between benefits and costs, Owing to somewhat muddled 
presentations. however, it is not perfectly clear whether this criterion 
could be satisfied by the p:i.~ocedures advocated. 
Capital Rationing and the Ranking Problem 
At least four data formulations have been suggested as appropriate 
for the capital rationing case: {w} ratio of present values of gross 
benefit and co st streams; (x) ranking by internal rate of return; (y) 
ranking according to present value; (z) ratio of present value of net 
benefit stream to initial costs. Project sets ranked by (w) and (x) always 
tend to differ, Extent of '~he difference depends upon the range of values 
the ratio of annual operating and maintenance costs (0) to the fixed initial 
investment (C ) assumes for different projects (6, pp. 53-60; 16, lOB-
o 
121). Ranking according to the ratio of gross benefit and cost streams 
(w) is particularly favorable to projects having low values for OIC , that 
o 
is, where most of the cost is initial investment. The main criticism of 
the B/C ratio (w) is that it gives no indication of potential increases in 
net worth. In Table 3 examples, the greatest increase is associated with 
project A, whereas project B exhibits the highest cost-benefit ratio, 
1. 54. Since project A would also have been given priority by reliance 
w 
x 
y 
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Table 3. Variation in ranking re suIting from. four m.ethods of di splaying 
cost-benefit data 
Project A Project B 
1. Inve stm.ent $100,000 $100,000 
2. Each year's out of pocket expense 50,000 5,000 
3. Each year's benefit 70,000 20,000 
4. Pre sent value of 20 year cost stream. 
discounted at 50/0 723,000 162,300 
5. Pre sent value of 20 year benefit 
stream. at 50/0 872,200 240,200 
6. Ratio of discounted gross benefits to 
discounted costs (B/C) 1. 21 1. 54 
7. Increase in pre sent worth 149,200 86,900 
8. Internal rates of return (approx. ) 180/0 150/0 
9. Pre sent value of net benefits 261,709 196,282 
z 10. Ratio of net benefits to initial 
inve stm.ent (Bl/C
o
) 2.62 1. 96 
upon the average internal rate of return m.ethod (x), it m.ay be thought 
that high internal rate value s are directly related to high potential 
i:Qcreases in net worth. Generally this is true, but not always. First, 
the internal rate of return rule m.ay give am.biguous (non-unique) 
a,nswers; for a general net receipts or net benefit stream. there m.ay be 
none, one, two, or any num.ber of solving rates of interest. Second, 
the internal rate of return rule m.ay give answers that are actually 
wrong (inconsistent with m.axim.ization) rather than being m.erely am.-
biguous. Both these objections are associated with project ranking 
situations exhibiting dissim.ilar revenue and cost tim.e paths or where 
costs tend to be bunched at the end, rather than the beginning of the 
investm.ent period. This situation is illustrated by projects A and B 
in Table 4. If they are taken to be m.utually exclusive, then the average 
internal rate of return rule (p a) would select B, when actually the 
;'.1 
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greatest increase in present worth can be obtained by choosing A, if the 
appropriate discount rate is 4 percent (column 5). As a practical matter 
the appropriateness of (x) hinges on whether costs and revenues exhibit 
the "usual" time paths. If they do the average internal rate of return 
rule will insure maximization of wealth per dollar of outlay and, In 
addition, there will be no need to defend a discount rate choice. 
Neverthele ss the average internal rate of return rule is logically 
defe'ctiv.e and Hirshliefer and Mc.Kean have both argued that its use should 
Table ,4. Ranking by internal-rate-of-return and alternative methods:' 
choices among interrelat~d projects 
1 Z 3 4 5 6 7 
Present Pre sent Value 
Alternative C Yr l Yr Z p Value Per -eurrent-eap~tal Projects 0 a Discounted Unit 
at p ( 40/0) B Ie * B Ie + 
ms 1 0 1 0 
A -100 0 115 70/0 6.323 1. 13 1. 106 
B -100 110 ,0 90/0 5, 7 1. 10 1. 10 
e -100 104 0 40/0 0 L04 1. 04 
D -100 0 108.16 40/0 0 1. 06 1.04 
* +Assuming market rate of 20/0 
Assuming market rate of 40/0 
be shunned (even though the alternatives require establishment of a dis-
count rate). McKean advocates use of method (y) (Table 3), ranking 
according to present worths (16; F. 89). He obtains the appropriate 
interest rate by discounting the benefit stream of the potential elements 
of the project set at various rates until one is found which just exhausts 
the budget with all acceptable elements having positive net worths (the 
marginal project will have a zero net worth). Call this rate P ,the 
ms 
marginal internal rate of return for the set of projects {i. e., p' = p 
ms a 
100 
of the marginal project). 1 
According to Hirshliefer, McKean's rule fails in certain cases (10; 
pp. 170 -171). If the in'/estment budget were large enough to select two of 
the four projects in Table 41 then McKean's rule would choose project As 
but could not discriminate between C and D, Both latter projects require 
inputs of $100 at to' but C yields $104 in tl while D yields $106. 16 in 
t 2• Calculation shows that each has an internal rate of return equal to 4 
percent and one or the other is the marginal project. McKean's present 
worth rule gives no way to make a selection, JOT both have zero present 
values when discounted at 4 percent, the p for the set. 
. ms 
Hirshliefer argue s that re solution of thi s dilemma would require 
McKean to depart from the selection of an interest rate by purely "internal" 
rate of return pTocedures. It would require the assumption that only initial 
construction budgets are fixed, and that funds may be transferred between 
future periods by borrowing or lending at some market rate, r, Supposing 
funds can be loaned or borrowed at 2 percent and that funds are transferred 
between periods 1 and 2, then in symbols, project D, (-100, 0,108.16), will 
be converted to (-100,106.04,0). This is superior to (-100,104, 0). Turning 
the problem about and thinking in terms of cash throughoffs from intermediate 
periods, then lending at 2 percent will convert project C, (-100, 104, 0) into 
(-100,0,106. 08), which is inferior to (-100, 0,.108.16). On this basis [that 
is, whenever r (2 percent) < p ] C is inferior to Do The "correct" set 
ms 
IS therefore A and D. 
To avoid these difficulties, Hirshliefer suggests ranking by use of 
rnethod (z)(Table 3), the ratio of present value of net benefits stream (quasi-
rents), 51' to initial costs, Co (10; p. 161, pp. 170-17l). At first glance 
it does appear that revision to yet another ratio formulation of the benefit-
cost data will accomplish the desired goal. But closer inspection fails to 
reveal a formal difference from McKean's present value rule (y). 
Examination of the B]/C values in column 6 (Table 4) reveals that, 
. 0 
given a market rate of 2 percent, the B 1/ Co rule doe s not select the 
"correct" set, A and D. Similarly, inspection. of row 10 in Table 3 
1 This proces s was used to generate the value s shown in column 5 
of Table 4. 
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reveals that the B 1 I Co criterion selects the project with the greatest 
potential increase in net worth. However, as long as the internal rate 
of return on the marginal project is not ambiguous, then the McKean 
and Hirshliefer systems are logically equivalent. This is easily shown 
through comparison of comumns 6 and 7 in Table 4. The Bl/C
o 
ratios of column 6 have been recomputed using a discount rate equal to 
p (4 percent), and displayed in column 7. The rankin. g s are now 
ms 
the same as they were by the McKean method (column 5). Again, 
there is no way to choose between projects C and D. In other words, 
the only time there is any difference between the two methods is when 
the interest rate employed in borrowing or transferring funds is un-
equal to McKean's p • If McKean were to utilize the discount rate 
ms 
established in an "appropriate" market or by the "best" private 
alternative use for funds (as suggested by Hirshliefer), there would be 
no operational difference between the two methods. 
In summary, when funds are rationed and the only question is 
that of ranking, display of cost-benefit data in the form of net discounted 
benefits and initial costs (methods y or z of Table 3) will most likely 
prevent ambiguity and outright error in ranking. But remember, a 
discount rate must be known or given from some source. Continual 
selection of projects with the highest benefit-cost ratios or average 
internal rates of return implies an acceptance of the economic con-
sequences associated with choice of P as the investment scale 
a 
criterion. It is true, however, that such project scales may never be 
achieved because the whoJ.e discussion of various ways of displaying 
cost-benefit data rests on the implicit acceptance of technologically 
fixed project scale s. 
Once it is assumed that project scales can be varied somewhat, 
even if public works budgets are fixed, computation of net benefit-cost 
ratios or present values is unnecessary. Fulfillment of an adequate 
investment criterion is reduced to the satisfaction of the requirement 
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to equate the discounted value s of the marginal benefits of enough projects 
to exhaust the budget (6; pp. 66-67}. That is to say, the relative activi-
ty level rule must be followed (VMP = V}yfP = ... VMP = P ). 
cx ,cy cn c 
Suppose that scales 2.:i.'e not fixed by inflexihle engineering consideration, 
doe s the !!ranking p:roblem!! neces sarily disappear? Only if the budget 
is going to be spent anyway and if discontinuities in cost and return 
streams or functions are not unmanageable. In practice it may be quite 
unlikely that both conditionE, would be simultaneously satisfied. First, 
budgets are somewhat flexible, often sized a:::cording to the number of 
projects that can be justified, i .. e., that cc.n surpass a given minimum 
cost-benefit ratio. Secol",-d, project scales cannot be juggled about over 
nicely differentiable cost and return streams; it may be impossible to 
balance marginal value benefits per dolla:r of cos';; in dl directions. 
For these reasons some :;.-anking may always be necessary. How is it 
to be accomplished? Be2.2'j,Cl.g in mind earlier arguments about the 
display of cost-benefit da.ta, those projects exhibi.ting the highest 
average internal :i.'ates of return or the greatest increases in net worth 
. 1 
should be chosen fust. 
No Capital Rationing 
Where there is no capital rationing the level of investment should 
be guided by the criterion of maximizing the difference between benefits 
and costs. B-C is maximized w~'1.en the meu'ginal internal rate of return 
is equal to the interest rate; so long as the marginal rate of return is 
above the interest rate, additions to the investment bring additions to 
the present value of prof.itt). 'f1.1e marginal inte!'::lal rate of return (p ) 
m 
is the rate which, if used to discount down to the present the marginal 
revenue due to an additional unit of funds inve sted, makes the present 
1 
These choices do not imply acceptance of the same scale 
criterion. 
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value of that revenue equal to unity. Owing to somewhat muddled de-
scriptions of their procedures, it is difficult to determine whether or 
not either McKean' j:i or Hirshliefer' s recommendations satisfy the above 
condition. 
McKean argues that if a firm has investment opportunities, "in-
cluding chances to loan money, which yield more than the rate at which 
funds can be borrowed on the money market it should invest in its 
projects until the next-be st opportunity yields no more than the market 
rate." (16; p. 77) But McKean defines yield in a particular way. 
"Yield" means "the rate of discount which makes the present value of 
the project's receipt stream equal to the present value of its cost stream, 
or in other words, the rate of discount which makes present worth zero" 
(16; p. 77). This of course defines the average internal rate of return, 
p • Thus if his rule is followed, it might lead to the establishment bf 
a 
project scale s where B - C = O. Whether or not this will actually 
happen depends upon the interpretation given McKean's meaning of the 
term "incremental investment. II 
It appears that this term is used in two senses: (a) sometimes it 
means the marginal increment altering the scale of a single project; 
(b) at other times the incremental investment is,the marginal project 
or the marginal element of a project set. In situation (a), carrying p 
a 
of the marginal increment to equality with the ip.terest rate, and treating 
the result as an equality of p (for the individual project) with the rate 
m 
of interest, may be assumed to have a minor influence on the effective 
achievement of B - C maximization. In situation (b) the rpethod may 
fail. Here p for the marginal project (assuming it is not ambiguous) 
a 
becomes p for the set of projects. The interest rate is then used as 
. ms --
discount rate (where p = r) to define all the individual projects with-
ms 
in the potential set which have positive present worth. But the sum of 
these positive present worths may fall rather short of maximizing B - C. 
To maximize B - C for a ~of projects, individual projects must be 
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scaled such that p of each equals the market rate, r. Only if sizes 
m 
of the various projects are technologically given, or "fixed" because of 
interdependencie s (which amounts to the same thing), would the strict 
application of McKean's :ru.le corne as close to satisfying the B - C max 
criterion as possible. 
Hirshliefer argues that "if benefits and costs are calculated cor-
rectly, it is obvious that every project with a. B/C ratio greater than 
one should be adopted since, if B/C is gTeater th2.n unity, then B - C 
mUE>t be positive (there is a net surplus of benefit over costs)(lO; p. 138). 
While this conclusion is correct, it must be noted that the mere existence 
of 2. net surplus indicates nothing about a maximum surplus. None of 
this is surprising since it h'ls ah-eady been shown that Hirshliefer's 
"logically prior" criterion is fundamentally the same as the McKean 
procedure. The rule only maximize s B - C for a set of projects where 
the scale of each element is taken as technologically given. To the degree 
that individual project scale s are variable, maximization of B - C 
require s that all potential projects be driven to tLle size where the 
marginal internal rate of reb_un from individual projects is eq\lal to the 
interest rate. 
With respect to single projects, McKear;.' 5 system, if applied to 
the increments of an individl:"J project, will l·ead ,:0 a scale such that 
B - C is approximately maximized. But in the case of application to a 
single project the Hi::."shliefer, Dehaven" and Milliman method is not a 
scale criterion at all. The mere computation of the pre sent value of a 
project can only indic2.te whethe:i.' or not "costs" will be "covered. " 
lIt sumrna:r-y: Even if budgets are not limited, the B - Cmax 
criterion cannot be achieved unless individual project scales can be 
varied. However, in contrast with the rationed funds case, a definite 
inve stment scale criterion is accepted as app,~opriate by all. Again, as 
in the cost-benefit display proced'..lres most advocated for the rationed 
situation, an "appropriate" inte:t"est ratemust be chosen for this rate 
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establishes the lower limit of acceptable maxginal internal rates of re-
turn from successive increments of investment. 
There is another way of viewing the investment situation when 
funds are unrationed that is not considered in any of the works of the 
authors cited. If one imagines public investment to be an on-going 
activity without time limit, then in a sense, public funds are always 
limited. For even if it were financially pos sible to undertake all "optimum" 
scale projects planned at anyone time, it is technically impossible to 
build everything simultaneously. Thus it may be that the public should 
maximize the return per dollar as society goes forward through time. 
This would mean that the B - Cmax criterion would not be appropriate 
but rather that project scales should be established by the requirement 
to maximize p or B / C. FStudents should also evaluate the argument 
a . 
in connection with the choice of p = r (Figure 28) as a scale criterion.] 
a 
"Durability" and "Technique" in Cost-Benefit Literature 
Careful reading of benefit-cost literature reveals a lack of ex-
planation as to why only project size or scale is treated as an optimization 
problem. Ordinarily optimization of durability (time life of the benefit 
stream) and optimization of technique (ratio of variable inputs to fixed 
capital) must also be considered. 
Durability. It appears that optimization of durability is ignored 
because planning decisions often are treated as choices between projects 
where the life of each has already been pre -determined by engineering 
design. I Certainly engineering technology may dictate "minimum" 
I"The choice between a very durable asset and a flimsier one, when 
either would be appropriate to the immediate job to be done, is rarely 
publicly discussed .•.. The local Works Department ... must only convince 
the government that the durability of the project which it undertakes is 
appropriate to the task. The result can be seen in the massive bridges 
and darns scattered throughout the land. "(24; p. 89) 
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construction or quality standards, but beyond this there is no necessary 
connection between the length of Hfe "ordinaTilyll engineered into a project 
and II optimum II du.rability. 
On first view it seemt, 3.ppl'opriate to ignoTe t:1.iE: optimization 
dimension only i!l cases where th.e minimum engineering life would pro-
duce benefits for very long p~:riods. If these periods las;: beyond 60 to 
70 years, funds horizons lna.y be treated as independent of project lives, 
fOT present values of benefit".> are then fairly insensitive to data changes 
(using typical values for the d!.scount rate). The number of public works 
projects likely to ex.h.ibj.t sud1 long live::; is obviously a question of fact, 
but the:L"e doe s appear to be c:r.. increasing tendency to plan long-lived 
projects as "programmed" de\·elopments. Such programs require 
segments of a given project to be cO~1.3tructed successively over time. 
In these cases lives of some segments may be fairly short and acceptance 
of durability as pUTely an engineering variable becomes even less 
s<1ti sfactory. 
Unfortunately there 3.:re serious difficulties standing in the way of 
any improvement in evaluation methods. The problem of durability 
optimization can be considered f:!:"om two aspects: 
1. As a determination of the lifetime of a given durable good. 
2. As a determination of the technical lifetime that should be built 
in during construction. (13; p. 101) 
In the past II authors like Jor.n Rae, Bohm-Bawerk. Akerman, and 
Wicksell tried to determine t':1e technical lifetime" because their attention 
was addressed mainly to durable goods of the " const2nt efficiency type" 
(e. g., ele ctric light bulb s) (13; p. 101). But determin2.tion of such life-
times is not a very important economic problem. {n contrast, determi-
nation of the lifeti.me of durable goods of the "diminishing efficiency 
type (e. g., machinery and buildings) is a difficuli: problem because 
repairs and service expenditu:res can p~<:,olong life almost indefinitely 
(13; p. 102). "There is, L~~len, e·;Ten unde? static ar.st::mp'tions, a problem 
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of how long it pays to go on extending the lifetime of a given durable good 
of this type, a problem that must be solved "before the entrepreneur can 
choose the optimum durability of a durable good ... 11 (13; p. 102) 
The need to fix optimum life spans creates little difficulty when 
dealing with constant efficiency type of goods, but in the case of diminishing 
efficiency types. the replacement lifetime cannot be established unless 
the quality (i. e., the need fOT future maintenance) is given. At the same 
time the quality cannot be established until the optimum lifetime is known. 
"It is here impossible to establish a functional relationship between cost 
of investment and the durability of the equipment as could be done with 
the constant efficiency type. 11 (13; p •. l24) Two possibilities seem to be 
open: 
1. Reduce the problem to choice between capital inputs exhibiting 
various degrees of "engineered" durability, or 
2. Assume "quality 1l as given and attempt to establish optimum 
lifetimes. 
Recent work by Vernon Smith suggests that this latter approach would 
lead to fruitful results (26; Chaps. IV and VI, expo pp. l64-l69). 
Technique. It is not surprising that the effects of interest or wage 
rate changes on production techniques are ignored by the critics of the 
American water resources program. First, as a practical matter, there 
are enough constraints upon choice of technique to inhibit response unless 
changes in the data are very large (13; pp. 127-128). Second, in the case 
of public enterprise, it is possible that the managers have no direct con-
trol over choice of technique for they do not control current inputs, e. g. , 
there is no way to control current individual farm inputs that will be 
combined with the fixed inputs of a given irrigation project; in the case 
of the production of highway services, there is no way to control 
completely the individual use of roads. 
This must all be conceded, but during the investment planning 
and evaluation period, before funds have been committed, failure to 
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consider potential patterns of production techniques is less excusable. 
In case s where it is impossible to control current inputs, it may still 
be possible to predict their variation over time. These expected future 
alterations in the ratio of current inputs to capital inputs will affect the 
. initial choice of investment scale and possibly the initial choice of 
durability. 
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XV 
INTEREST RATE THEORIES 
Modern "theorifs of interest" are hypotheses about economic 
interrelationships that give rise to particular interest rate levels or 
to alterations in rates. Interest rate theories that emphasize the 
physical or material relationships that underly all money transactions 
are known as "real theories!!: !!monetary theories, " on the other hand, 
stress the economic forces in operation in money or capital 'TIarkets. 
Real Theories 
Marginal productivity theory. As the amount of capital equipment 
within an economy grows, the annual return from individual increments 
falls. This must be the case, for given the state of the arts, the best 
paying opportunities are exploited first and less satisfactory returns 
must be accepted as poorer and poorer alternatives are taken up. In 
the aggregate, the average return on capital falls over time, but the 
marginal return falls even faster. Since at any given moment, the 
stock of capital goods is fixed, the marginal return associated with 
that stock is the "going rate!! of interest. In addition, since capital 
goods may be treated as inputs much as any other factors of production, 
the marginal physical product of capital goods must be identical with 
the interest rate at any moment in time. Figure 29 makes clear the 
analogy between increases in capital and the law of diminishing returns 
as applied to marginal productivity theory. 
Allowance for technological advance is made by shifting the MPP 
curve to the right. (Defined in money terms, technological advance 
means that a given amount of capital goods produces more now than 
it could before; the MPP of capital must be greater at all levels.) The 
tendency for interest rates to fall as capital goods are accumulated is 
offset to a greater or lesser degree by technological advances. 
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Figure 29. Marginal productivity of capital 
Loanable funds theory. This theory concentrates upon the 
acquisition costs of a particular increment of capital goods. Prior to 
making any physical addition to an economy's productive capital, an 
array of investment choices from relatively high to relatively low returns 
may be thought to exi st. In Figure 30 such an array, termed an inve st-
ment demand schedule, is presented. The money capital .for the in-
ve stment increment actually selected most carne from suppliers of 
funds. These suppliers are more interested in making loans at high 
rather than low rates of interest. If savings funds would actually be 
forthcoming as diagrammed in Figure 30, the market rate of interest 
would be e stabli shed at an equilibrium of saving sand inve stment 
devices. This "price" in turn would dictate the final choice of an in-
vestment increment. 
It is argued that the loanable funds theory emphasize s short-run 
or existing real forces, whereas the marginal productivity theory depends 
upon the workings ·of secular or long-run changes. 
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Monetary Theorie s 
Liquidity preference theory. According to thi s theory, the key to 
particular rate levels is theform in which cq.sh balances (not needed for 
current consumption) are held. Where there is a 'resale market for 
bonds and other securities, cash can readily be traded for "paper assets'l 
that not only bear interest '{;ut (more importantly) which mayor. may not 
appreciate in value. It is the expectations of potential for capital gain 
or loss that determines how cash balances are held. In general, the 
lower paper asset prices fall, the greater the expectations for a rise 
. r~ther than further fall--individuals would prefer to be "fully invested" 
in this case. When asset prices are high, the danger of capital depreciation 
is also relatively high--individuals would prefer to stay out of the market 
or move to more liquid assets (cash) in order to protect their funds. If 
it is recalled that high pric~s for paper assets are associated with low 
interest rates and vice versa, a schedule C2.n be drawn up of how 
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Figure 31. Liquidity preference determination of interest rates 
ipdividuals would prefer to hold cash balances at various rates of 
intere st. 
In Figure 31 a liquidity preference curve (L ) is drawn to show 
p 
that the lower the interest rate (higher asset prices) the greater the 
de sire to hold cash. De spite preference s, at any moment in time only 
so much cash, other than that needed for consumption transactions, 
is ·available~ Since this is a known, fixed amount, the interest rate is 
given. 
Suppose at a relatively low interest rate, security purchasers are 
unsatisfied. This means new bank. loans, an expanded money supply, and 
even higher asset prices. If buyers disappear, this means that some 
people are covering bank loans, security price s will be driven down, 
interest rates will go up, and the money supply will tighten. Exactly 
opposite movements are possible starting. at a position of relatively high 
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interest rates. The tendency for monetar'Y expansion may be said to be 
greater in this 2atter case, wheTeas on bal2.nce the tendency would be for 
contraction at low intere st rate s. 
When expectations are reaHy bad 01" zoeally good the tendencie shave 
been known to be reversed, i. e., duTing the 1930' sand 1920' s. Since 
the Federal Reserve Bank can also buy and sen securities, it can affect 
the money supply in the same fashion as individuals. 1£ the "Fed" buys 
securities when private individuals are very pess~mistic it can offset the 
tendenc/ of intf-:~est rat"s to rIse to deflationary ex~:remes. 1£ its 
purchases are heavy en,>:rgh the Fed can lower interest rates (by expanding 
the money supply) and hopefully stimulate any potential investors that 
may be sensitive to opportu,nities to bo::row at lower rates. Whether such 
stimulation would actually bear fruits depends upon two factors, the actual 
shape of the L function and the interest rate elasticity of investment demand. 
1£ the L C:UTve becomes essentially horizontal at some interest 
p 
rate, no amount of monet~ry expansion, beyond a point, will induce 
further rate reductions. More impoTtant, a lot of evidence has been 
accumulated to show that so much expansion of large companies is 
financed through cash flow'3 generat.ed internaHy by their operations, 
that aggregate investment demand may be "interest inelastic." 
Time preference theoTY. The significant attribute of this theory 
which distinguishes it from the others is the importance of time. As 
is the case with the other theories of ir..terest, however, the time 
preference theory can be bToken down into demand and supply determi-
nants. 
On the demand side, reeources are used to pl'oduce either con-
sumptiop goods or capital goods. Capi~al goods a:r-e those goods which 
are used to produce othe:r goods that might be eventually consumed. 
Thus the production of capitc:1 goods means tb:i;; society fOTegoe s the 
production of consumption goods. This "roundabout" production of 
capital goods yields a rate of productivity in terms of the eventual increase 
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in consumer goods. This provides the inducement for the producers of 
capital goods to demand resou:cces for this purpose, and generally it is 
theorized that the greater t.he length of the period of "roundaboutne s s" 
the greater the yield of the resources. 
On the supply side, p'€ople must be induced to provide the resource s 
from which the capital goods can be produced. There must be a sacrifice 
of current consumption which is the same thing as saying that saving 
occurs. The cost of savoing reflects itself in the unpleasantness of 
postponing consumption; i. e., in time preference. There are a number 
of reasons advanced as to why people prefe:r pre sent rather than future 
consumption. They may not be alive later to enjoy the fruits of absti-
nence. Prices may rise so that the real value of consumption may fall. 
In addition, people just seem to be constituted in such a way that they 
prefer pre sent enjoyment over p:rospective enjoyment. In any case, 
this theory postulates thai the rate of inte:rest on saving is the inducement 
to entice people to postpone consumption. The greater the rate of interest 
the greater the inducement to save. 
The equilibrium interest rate is set by the interaction of demand 
and supply determinants. 
~. 
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XVI 
SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATES 
Assumin~ that cost and benefit streams must be discounted with 
some interest rate, the following discus sion will be devoted to what 
various people have indicated would be appropriate for public inve stment 
purposes. 
McKean 
In Efficiency in C. vernment Through Systems Analysis (16), Roland 
McKean advises discounting at the "market" rate if there is no budget 
restraint (16; pp. 76-81). Just what "market" rate is appropriate in 
the non-ration case is never made clear because his attention is directed 
largely to rationed situations. A fixed budget is taken to require the 
computation of an "internal" discount rate, the marginal internal rate 
of return for the project set (p ). The value of p is actually equal 
ms ms 
to the average internal rate of return generated by the last project or 
portion of the ·project which could be built so that the entire appropriated 
budget will just be used up. The trouble with this concept is that it doe s 
not relate in any way to the social time preference or to the opportunity 
cost of capital. If either of these concepts has relevance as a discount 
factor, then McKean's procedure cannot be valid. 
Eckstein 
In Water-Resource Development (6), Otto Eckstein also presents 
his analysis in the context of a budget restraint, but his approach to the 
"proper" discount rate involves the use of a discount rate determined 
"outside"the project set. This does not mean that he accepts the 
Hirshl~efer argument that project should necessarily earn the rate of 
return equal to private companies whose investment decisions are 
comparable to those made by public agencies (6; p. 146). He first 
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discusses the question of the borrowing rate for government bonds. If 
the government sought to raise investment funds for water resource 
development in the capital market it would find lenders were willing to 
supply the money at the going Federal rate. This might b~ taken as 
evidence that the social cost of a loan is measured by this rate. Eckstein 
argue s that this line of reasoning overlooks two fundamental factor s 
which make the argument invalid. The first factor is the social cost of 
risk bearing, since if a project should fail to produce the expected 
benefits, the loss is socialized or pooled so that bond holders do not run 
any risk of forfeiture. Any loss is suffered by general tax payers. The 
Federal bond rate does not measure the social cost of capital since it 
makes no allpwance for risks of individual projects. Secondly, most of 
the money that is acquired through bond sales is not acquired by voluntary 
sales to the public. An increase in the federal water resource program 
will require an increase in taxa,tion and there is no voluntary choice 
about the payment of these taxes. Besides, there is even a question 
about whether the sale s· of government bonds reflect open market 
voluntary exchanges or whether the rate is pegged at some 10Vy' level by 
sales to the Federal Reserve System from commercial banks. 
Eckstein also rejects private market rates as being inappropriate. 
An increase in public expenditure s for water re source development 
comes at the expense of tax increases, and these increases cut into 
consumption as well as into investment; thus the rate of return on the 
private investments also holds little normative significance for public 
proj ects. (But at the margin the returns to consumption and saving or 
inve stITlent are exactly the same as in the private sector. ) 
Eckstein then asks what rate would be an appropriate measure of the 
social costs of federal capital. He argues that this rate can only be 
estimated by tracing the capital to its source and discovering its value 
in the use to which it would be put in the absence of a public budget. 
Since the money is actually raised by taxation, the incidence of the 
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marginal tax is a consequence of the project and must be assigned to 
various businesses and households. An elaborate analysis of this type 
is contained in Krutilla and Eckstein's Multiple Purpose River Develop-
ment (12). Assuming 1955 market conditions (full employment and 
consumers' sovereignty with regard to inter-temperal choices) the social 
costs of federal financing are set at 5 to 6 percent (12; p. 120). 
Eckstein modified the above argument in an important respect in 
his own book. He argues that a discount rate of 5 or 6 percent would 
preclude the justification of most projects, especially most long-lived 
projects. He argues that there may be a bias against redistribution of 
income toward future generations and therefore too few long-lived projects. 
His proposal therefore is that the following compromise should be made to 
preserve the long-time perspective of the federal program. At the same 
time the compromise would insure that only projects are undertaken for 
which capital would yield as great a value as it would in its alternative 
employments. He suggests letting the government use a relatively low 
interest rate for the design and evaluation of projects. But let the projects 
be considered justified only if the benefit-cost ratio is well in excess of 
unity. He then provides illustrations of how various low interest rates and 
high benefit-cost ratios interact to produce the equivalent of a discount rate 
of 6 percent. 
[ It is easy to see that the Krutilla and Eckstein analysis continues to 
be influenced by the as sumption that competitive private uses for capital 
are entitled to the same consideration, from the point of view of the public 
interest, as government sponsored projects. This assumption is unlikely 
to be acceptable to everyone. A very rough guide to the degree of its ac-
ceptability (when planning specific projects) might be given by the degree 
to which it appears pos sible to apply the "benefit principle" of taxation to 
the projects in question. The assumptions may not be acceptable for 
evaluation of the worth of national defense measures or the worth of those 
kinds of public works made available to the. public completely without charge.] 
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Scott 
In Natural Resources: The Economics of Conservation (24), Anthony 
Scott addresses the question of whether a special (lower) social rate 
exists (in the sense that it has some support in political theory). That 
such support clearly exists is doubtful (24; chap. 8). He quotes Professor 
Robbins to the effect that there is no way to show "it is usually a good 
thing to force upon the different members of the community, through the 
apparatus of politic s, a rate of accumulation fundamentally out of relation 
to their time preferences formulated individually." (22; pp. 25-27) 
The only elements of a rudimentary theory justifying political 
intervention are held by Scott to be: 
1. "A socialist argument that in a planned economy accumulation 
would be, or should be, quicke:r than in a private economy; " 
(24; p. 91) 
2. A belief in a partnership theory of social continuity, and that 
"society should be governed as though this contract existed, 
and in such a way as to achieve its assumed ends." (24; p. 93) 
"'The resultant doctrine seems, however, far removed from western 
attitudes to the role of the state or the meaning of social obligations. " 
(24; p. 97) Scott argues that there is no evidence that the time horizons 
. . 
of private decisions are less than state decisions, and that in our 
society market interest rates do reflect the relative preferences of 
individuals, and the opportunity cost of capital. He therefore would use, 
for most circumstances, a private market rate of interest. 
Hirschliefer, Milliman, and DeHaven (10) 
These authors reach the same conclusion as does Anthony Scott. 
They argue that in the case of most large, long-lived projects, risk is 
extremeiy important p.nd that a large adjustment for risk should be made 
in the interest rate. They would go to the private markets for comparable 
kinds of services under comparable risk situations and use the prevailing 
, . 
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rate. They even argue that 6 percent might be too low and that a rate 
approaching lO to 12 percent would be more reali stic. 
Marglin 
Will private market interest rates do for discounting? If not, a 
social rate should be used, not only for government projects, but for 
all investment decisions. (This is an important point.) Should there 
be a difference between the way we view savings vs. consumption decisions 
collectively and the way we 'view them individually? 
In "The Social Discount Rate and the Optimal Rate of Investment" 
{.39). Stephen Marglin rejects Professpr Pigou's authoritarian solution 
that g,overnment is the protector of all rights of future generations. He 
argues that this conflicts with the notion that a democratic government 
reflects only the preferences of individuals who are presently members 
of the body politic. Whether individuals regard the welfare of future 
generations is a moot question. 
In addition, Marglin rejects the" schizophrenic" solution that 
economic man. and the citizen are two different individuals. He says 
this solution is artificial since we cannot say which is the true preference 
map. 
An acceptable solution is as follows. Utility from consumption is 
dependent upon the level of consumption of others. An individual may 
wish to have more than he does, but in the political field where these 
kinds of decisions are made for some products he cannot get more 
unless he can find enough others who feel the same way. To get this 
kind of support at the national level involves tremepdous costs which 
curtail savings below the optimum level. (Marglin's reasoning may be 
correct a priori, but the importance of this factor remains open to 
question. Before its weight can be assessed there must be some estimates 
as to how hi,h the market rate is actually pushed by this factor. There 
are no known attempts to quantify this influence. ) 
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Steiner 
In "Choosing Among Alternative Public Investments in the Water 
Re source Field" (41), Peter Steiner argues that the social productivity 
of investment depends on where the funds come from and upon the 
particular investment opportunities displaced by the planned project 
expenditures. Steiner seems to argue for the supra-marginality of projects 
in the private sector which are d~ splaced by public expenditure s. If the se 
private projects really are the ones replaced, then the social rate of 
interest must be even higher than private market r~tes. If, of course, 
the reverse is true, that is, that the supra-marginality exists in public 
projects, then the social rate of interest may be lower than private 
market rates. Again, much empirical study is needed to determine the 
importance of this argument. 
Feldstein 
In "The Social Time Preference Discount Rate itt Cost-Benefit 
Analysis" (32), M. S. Feldstein has argued that in traditional capital 
theory a single interest rate equ.ates the marginal time preference, 
(MTP of savers with the marginal productivity of investment). But he 
denies that this single rate can be used in a mixed, complex economy 
(such as ours) fOT piscounting purposes. And in fact, it is impossible 
to determine any single rate of interest due to the multitude of earning 
assets with different productivities. 
Feldstein identifies two types of discount :rates: 1) the social time 
preference (STP) and 2) the social opportunity cost (SOC). STP assigns 
current values to future consumption and need not be constant over time. 
SOC measures social value of the best alternative use of funds. SOC 
depends upon the source of funds, and therefore applies or reflects STP. 
Thus Feldstein argues that the STP rate or function is the most appropri-
ate one. 
1i . 
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STP cannot be derived from market rates but must be administratively 
determined. Even in a perfect capital market, STP would not equal market 
rates of interest. In his work, Feldstein demonstrates that Fisher's 
indifference curve analysis may be utilized to show the properties of the 
STP function and its relation with the STP rate. It is then possible to 
say that a useful X ante estimate of the STP l'ate can be made. The 
STP rate may vary through time and response to changes in the con-
sumption level and growth rate, the rate of population growth and the 
pure time preference rate. It is not unreaf'')nable to expect the STP 
rate to rise as a function of time. Public investment decisions must 
also reflect the social opportunity cost of the funds. This can best be 
done by using a shadow price that reflects social time preference and 
the productivity of funds in private investment. 
In summary, it is clear that this area is still far from being settled. 
Many of the best economists in the country, mainly of the Harvard 
influence, argue strongly that the social rate of discount should be lower 
than market rates of interest. Equally eminent economists headquartered 
in Chicago argue that private rates of intere st should be used. (One 
wonders how much the ideological position of these economists is 
reflected in their feelings about appropriate discount rates. ) 
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XVII 
THEORY OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
The benefits or services of certain desirable resources are not 
subject to private ownership. Air for breathing or combustion processes, 
use of the oceans for transport, wilderness recreation, or certain fishing 
activities are examples of resources, the uses of which are received or 
taken in common. The di stingui shing feature of the utilization of such 
resources is that individual ap~ropriation of benefits often takes place 
in an atmosphere of: . "If I don't get it, someone else will." That is to 
say, individual appropriations of benefits are marked (to a greater or 
lesser degree) by the treatment of scarce resources as though they are 
free. In certain cases, such as the appropriation of air, the good may 
indeed be free. Passage over a bridge or along a roadway, however, is 
a different matter. The way bridges, street~, and wilderness are 
used often leads to congestion and high social cost. More precisely, in 
such cases utilization patterns create technological diseconomies or a 
divergence between private and social costs. A reduction or elimination 
of such divergence s is a requirement if an "efficient" allocation of 
resources is to be attained. 
External Effects: A De scriptive Note 
In the past there has been a good deal of confusion over what 
actually constitutes an external economy (diseconomy) in the sense that 
social costs are unequal to private costs. Many of the examples 
originally put forward by Professor Pigou in the earliest editions of 
The Economics of Welfare have been shown to be incorrect (19, 20). 
Pigou argued that whereas competitive industry output is determined by 
the intersectioIl of the industry pemand curve and the industry marginal 
cost curve, I'correct" output would be determined by the intersection of 
the demand curve and a "marginal" cost curve indicating" 'the difference 
, , 
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made to aggregate (industry) expenses' by the production of one more 
unit." (32) The examples used by Pigou to support this contention all 
featured either diminishing returns or external diseconomies repre-
sented merely by rising transfer costs. Allyn Young and others have 
pointed out that these features do not create a divergence between social 
and competitive industry cost. 
If expansion of an industry increases factor cost at the margin 
because of diminishing returns or rising transfer costs, the marginal· 
social (opportunity) cost for resources yielding E. units continues to be 
given by the marginal cost of resources required for production of the 
nth unit. The intramargina1 factor s already being. supplied earn rents 
that are not social costs in terms of resources (38; p. 167). From a 
monetary standpoint, rising transfer costs and diminishing returns 
represent diseconomies to the firms within an indu·stry and are therefore 
labeled "pecuniaryexternal economies of scale. ,,1 
For other arguments, of course, Pigou did use examples of social 
diseconomies that are ignored by producers, e. g., wasteful forms of 
tenancy where" ••• a farmer in his natural and undisguised epdeavor to 
get·back as much of his capital as possible takes so much out of his land 
that, for sorpe years, the yield is markedly diminished." (19; p. 175) 
And Sidgwick speaks of cases of s'ocial waste when the "economic" 
exploitation of natural resources cannot be achieved without state action, 
e. g., ..hunting and fishing during the closed season (25; p. 410). As 
distinct from pecuniary diseconomies/economies, these exaIllples arise 
from the technical or institutional circumstances as a consequence of 
which scarce goods are treated as though they are free. 2 The· 
,lThis appears to have been the ac.cepted terminology ever since 
the publication of Viner's "Cost Curves and Supply Curves." (42) 
2Viner, op. cit., p., 221; external technological diseconoIl1ies are 
Ilincreases in technical coefficients of production as output of the industry 
as~a whole is increased. II 
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characteristic feature of these situations is a divorce between scarcity and 
effective ownership. 1 
This is easily seen in the case of highway transport. There it often 
is true that a road user's share of total transportation cost does not 
match his contribution to the total cost incurred by traffic in the system. 
Whenever there is congestion each additional vehicl~ causes some delay 
and risk to others already on the roads for which the owner does not bear 
the cost. These additional costs are not extracted for the use of road 
resources because it is difficult to prevent their use by anyone who desires 
to employ them. 
A similar example is provided by sea fisheries. Baumol gives as 
a description of an external diseconomy the case of the fishing industry 
where fish are scarce (2; p. 33). If one fishing firm increases its scale 
of operation it increases the scarcity of fish to the remaining firms and 
hence raises their costs. The analogy between a fishing boat and a motor 
vehicle is clear. In either situation the direct result of increased group 
activity is that individual IIfirmsll (boats or vehicles) require additional 
real inputs to maintain a given output. Pigou and Baumol both argue that 
the essence of such external diseconomies is that they arise from IIdefects" 
in the pricing system aj; a result of which the individual" firm is not 
lNatural resource examples are connected with only one of two 
sub-classes under the general heading: IIcases where the entrepreneur 
appropriates not less but more than the whole net gain to the community 
of his enterprise. II The other sub-class includes cases of social waste 
due to the interlocking of immobile factors like land sites l~ading on to 
the p:roblems of industrial location and town planning. e. g .• Profe s sor 
Pigou's case of smoky chimneys (Sidgwick. op. cit .• pp. 408-409). 
Sidgwick also identifies another general set of cas~s where' socially 
desired goods and services are not produced beca'1-se. due to technical 
peculiarities. the private producer cannot collect his reward. He cite s 
the cases of the lighthouse. afforestation, promotion of scientific 
re search, etc. (Ibid., pp. 406-407) 
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compensated (or compensating) for what it doe s to other firms in the 
industry (26 p. 33; 19, p. 183). 
External Effects and Group Average Costs 
In the original edition of the Economics of Welfare (20; p. 194) 
Pigou contended that, in the case of two roads connecting the same two 
points, if the superior (lower operating cost) road were subject to 
conge stipn and therefore diminishing returns, it would be over-exploited 
in competition unless taxed differentially. As an example of the situation 
between various firms in competitive industries, the road illustration 
was shown to be fallacious by Profe.ssor Knight who demonstrated that 
in a society in which property is privately owned the owner of the good 
road would set a toll that would raise the costs of travel on the good road 
until they were level with those on the poor road (37). This toll would 
exactly equal the "ideal output tax" suggested by Pigou and therefore over-
exploitation would be prevented by the normal market mechanism. 1 
Pigou's road illustration did not serve his intended purpose as 
regards competitive industries, but as regards roads it is an exact 
description of what may happen on a system of alternate routes between 
two areas. If "vehicle operators as a group" is, substituted for "competitive 
industries" then it becomes correct to say that competitive output of 
higbway services by a class of vehicles on a given road ~ determined 
by the curve of average group costs. 2 
Knight utilized exactly the same curve in his 1924 article. The 
situation is the same as given by Pigou, i. e., a system of two roads, 
1 Competitive industry supply price is established at the level of 
marginal factor cost for the entire industry. (This is analogous to the·level 
of cost established by the marginal or broad road in Pigou's example.) But 
as was shown by Allyn Young, Knight, and others, competitive supply price 
may be looked upon as average industry cost plus average Ricardian rent 
(i. e., the "toll"). (32, p." 249; 36, pp. 165-166) 
2And it is recognized that in real life roads are not privately owned. 
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one, superior in terITlS of lower transport costs, subject to diITlinishing 
returns because of width, the other a high cost road that is broad and not 
subject to diITlinishing retul'ns. Knight's geoITletry aSSUITles that the 
average vehicle of a single class would have constant ~osts for passing 
over the superior road unless the road becoITles congested. He also 
supplies a group ITlarginal cost curve for all the travellers using the 
road (this is analogous to the usual concept of a cOITlpetitive industry 
supply curve) [37, charts A, B, C, and D; d. 33. pp. 246-249 (descriptions 
of functionsE and t3 in Figures 2 and 3); 40, p. 210, n 4], 
The group ITlarginal cost curve or its analog" the group ITlarginal 
revenue product curve, is a ITleasure of the net gc.in to society through 
group use of the road. Knight shows that individuals of the group do not 
adjust their personal use of the superior road on the basis of group 
ITlarginal cost. Rather, their adjustITlent is on the basis of group average 
cost or, in terITlS of productivitie s, individual adjustITlent is on the basis 
of group average productivity. Individual users transfer to the broad road 
(where average and ITlarginal productivities are equal) only when average 
productivity on the superior road is equal to average productivity on the 
broad road. The result is that, in total, the individuals of the group 
"appropriate (in Sidgwick' s terITls) not less but ITlore than the whole net 
gain to the cOITlITlunity (road group of vehicle owners) of their enterprise. " 
Exactly siITlilar conclusions are reached by Gordon regarding 
production froITl sea fisheries (34). Since the na.tural resources of the 
sea are not private property, the rents superior fishing grounds ITlight 
yield are not capable of being appropriated by anyone. "The result is 
a pattern of cOITlpetition aITlong fisherITlen which. culITlinates in the dis-
sipation of the rent of the intra-marginal grounds." (34, p. 131) This 
COITles about because individual fisherITlen, in deciding which area to 
fish, do not take into account the marginal productivities of the various 
areas, they consider only average productivities. Then given the free 
and cOITlpetitive nature of fishing, "average productivity of all grounds 
(will) be brought to equality." (34, Ibid; cf. 3, p. 58, p. 63) 
Because it is not always immediately apparent why individuals 
should make private (marginal) decisions on the basis of average 
productivity. (cost) of fishing grounds or roads, some amplification of 
the Knight/Gordon analysis is warranted. The key to the situation is 
that on a given road or fishing grourtd each individual fisherman or 
, 
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vehicle operator appropriates> to himself some portion of total production 
(fish/highway services). Given that individuals are all "alik~, II each 
appropriates ,an equal share or an average percentage of the total. And 
given) in addition, diminishing returns., marginal physical product is 
less, than average physical product and consequently group marginal 
pr-oductivities (costs) are ignored. .The amount an individual is willing 
to expend to 'appropriate some average percentage of the total will be 
termed "private unit cost~ 11 But this unit cost is not a constant. The 
value changes with each expansion and contraction of group activity (~ay 
op,successive days). Thus as some function of the group's activity, the 
locus of all.possib1e unitcQlt values traces out a curve exactly equal 
to ·the ~roup average cost curve. As viewed by a sina1e individual'the 
function might loosely be· termed "a private marginal cost curve • .,1 
This argument maybe summarized as follows: 2 
Individual's co st .function 
Congestion function 
Individual restraint on· speed 
C. = f.(s.) 
1 l' 1 
S = gM, V> v* 
s. = Sfor all i V> v* 
1 
1Cf• 3, p. 87. But the term.does not·hav~ all the usual meaning. 
~nit cost is "marginal" only in the sense that it will be saved if the vehicle 
or fishing trip is cancelled. The first derivative of total cost of fishing 
effort on a fishing ground or of transport inputs on a highway is the margin-
al cost of total group activity. But this is usually thought of in terms of 
the COlts of a s~ngle day's fishing or a single hour of highway travel, etc. 
It 'is extremely difficult to conceive a total cost function for some quantity 
of transport service over a period of time (for an indlvidual) which could 
be differentiated in any meaningful way either with respect to the individual's 
"output" or with respect to vehicles per hour. 
2This proof provided by Dr. L. Hartman, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Colorado State University. 
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c .•. cost per mile for the ith vehicle 
i 
S = group average speed after onset of conge stion 
s. = ith individual speed 
1 
V = vehicles per hour; V* beginning of conge stion 
An individual's decision to use a particular road is based on private 
cost depending on observed flow of traffic, i. e., (with congestion) 
then 
c. + f. (S) and S = g{V) 
1 1 
n 
C = _1_ 2:: f. (5) = grou.p aye~age cost and if f. = £2 ... = f , 
nil ~'n
C. = C, V > V':< 
1 
Thus, for the marginal vehicle to enter the road after the onset of con-
gestion, private cost is C while group marginal cost is ~dC., where 
i 1 
dC. = f~ (S) dS, dS = g'(V)dV and dC. = f~ (5) g' (V) dV. 
1 1 J. 1 
Let C::< = ithindividua.l' s reservation cost whereby he will defer 
1 
the trip or choose ano'~her road, then the criterion for the trip is C. < C::<,. 
1 1 
Efficiency: Reduction of Technological Diseconomie s 
Having shown that veh~cle opeTators' decisions based on private 
costs lead inevitably to the creation of technological diseconomies, 
and assuming that an economic interpretation can be given the interaction 
of many drivers achieving a state of traffic flow equilibrium, some judg-
ment of the performance of the E:ystem it! requixed.. For this purpose the 
notion of "best" utilization or "efficiency" shall be employed. This may 
be described in general as m:i.nimization of aggregate transport cost 
(demand given) for all road users (3~ p. 8l). 
Cost minimization is :readily illustrated for the single corridor 
case involving only two routes. In Figure 32 the total hourly vehicle 
flow (demand fixed) is given by the length of the line O-X. Following 
" 
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Figure 32. Transport cost minimization on two roads 
the earlier argument, the equilibrium use of both roads will be such 
that the average cost of travel will be the same on each. Thus O-X' 
number of vehicles will utilize road No. 1 and the remainder of the 
129 
total, X' - X, road No.2. The total hourly cost of travel for some trip 
length will equal the sum of the rectangles 02f'SR and X'XTS. The 
problem is to minimize this sum for the given flow. If one vehicle is 
transferred from road No. 1 to road No.2, (shown as X'- X") total 
transport costs on No. 1 will fall (area OX"UR') and the rectangle of 
costs on No.2 increases to X"XT'V. It is clear that the reduction in 
cost on road No. 1 more than offsets the increase in cost on road No.2. 
On balance total transport cost has fallen. This shifting of "marginal" 
vehicle units is continued until the incremental cost reduction on road 
No. 1 is exactly equalled by the incremental cost increase on road No.2. 
The division of traffic between the two routes will thep be "efficient" in 
the sense that hourly costs of travel will be at the lowest level consistent 
with the fixed demando The incremental cost adjustments for the group 
of operators on either road brought about by the shifting of one operator 
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is summed up in the respective group marginal cost curves. Thus where 
the group marginal cost on road No. 1 is equal to that on No.2, total 
combined hourly costs of transport through the corridor are at a minimum. 
The difference between this total minimum cost and the total cost at the 
equilibrium division of flow is a measure of the technological diseconomies 
brought about by individual vehicle operators' private choices. 
When roads are subject to congestion, the presence of an extra 
vehicle in the traffic stream pause s delay and increased ri~k to all 
vehicle operators already on :the road, but the sum of such costs is not 
borne by the operator of the extra vehicle. He incurs only the average 
cost of travel per hour. If he were to incu.r the average cost plus a toll 
equal to the sum of the additional costs his vehicle's presence imposes 
on other vehicles, his private cost would equal the group marginal cost. 
Efficient division of flow between the two roads would be established 
when the· marginal group costs for the last vehicle on each road ar~ equa:l. 
The tolls would just hold the system in equilibrium, for the average cost 
plus the toll on road No. 1 would just equal the average cost plus the toll 
on road No.2. The same conditi.on must hold for any number of roads 
contained within a corridor (during peak travel periods). This can be 
shown best in terms of an adaptation of Knight's graphi<;: formulation. 
Figure 33 is designed to show just what toU rates would be necessary 
at given traffic volumes in a corridor composed of two roads. Suppose 
c 
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Figure 33. Surrogate pricing and rent maximizing tolls 
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road No. 1 is privately owned, but road No. 2 remains "free. II The 
traffic demand level for corridor travel at some particular time of day 
is shown by D-D. In the ab sence of a toll, vehicle operator s will stay 
on road No. 1 until the average cost of transport ri se s above the average 
cost of the next best alternative, road No.2. The average cost of travel 
on either road is equal to O_pl. If the owner of road No.1 wishes to 
maximize producers' surplus (or site-rents) from the best facility, a 
toll should be set equal to R-P'. 1. No consumers' surplus is extracted 
in this process; any such attempt would cause traffic to shift to the 
second road. In short, the owner of the "be stl! road see s the demand 
for use of hi s road as a perfectly elastic curve at the level 0 _pi (thus 
AR := MR). 
As a consequencq of the imposition of tolls traffic flow on road No. 
1 will be reduced to the O-M level and the flow On road No. 2 will 
2 increase from M' -Mil to M-M". In this over-simplified situation there 
is no diminution of corridor traffic flow. There is a definite reduction 
of congestion on road No.1, that is, a reduction in external effects. 
The system is in equilibrium because the private unit cost O-T plus toll, 
. 
R-P' on road No. 1 is equal to the private unit cost O_P' on road No.2. 
The road case lends itself especially well to the notion of surrogate 
pricing. But the simulation of a private market for other common pro-
perty resources can be accomplished in an analogpus manner. Numerous 
ingenious pricing systems have yet to be devised in cases involving 
recreation, etc. What must be noted in all common property uses is 
1 1 
The toll would equal (OR)(l +-E-); E:= elasticity of GAel' 
ZIt would not be correct to imagine that in the ab sence of a toll 
road users receive a gift of the producer's surplus. The pattern of 
individual drivers' activities dissipates the surplus through the higher 
costs caused by external effects. 
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the "lack of a market, " the tendency towards technological diseconomies 
and attendant mis-allocation of resources, and that many public investments 
establish or make more acces sible re source s that exhibit common pro-
perty features. 
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XVIII 
LOGIC IN CONSER V A TION 
No discussion of the economies of water allocation and develop-
ment would be complete without brief reference to the subject area known 
as "conservation." A whole philosophy of re source use has developed 
centering on thi s term, which has caught the fancy of the public and has 
dominated action decisions by government agencies. But despite the 
widespread appeal and impact of conservation, it is clear that the word 
means different things to various advocates who use it. Perhaps this is 
one reason why so many have found it possible to embrace the cause of 
conservation: they make it fit their own ends. The result has been a 
great deal of confusion and fuzzy thinking and a wide variety of policies 
and programs. 
Words and Goals 
Probably the most widespread use of the term conservation is in 
ref~rence to the avoidance of resource waste. In this context conserva-
tion unquestionably is regarded as something "good" and in the public 
intere st. For example, it is good to prevent soil erosion, it is good to 
maximize the yield from an oil well, it is good to grow two blade s of 
grass where one grew before, it is good to use water before it is wasted 
into the sea. 
An extreme version of the above notion as applied to stock resources, 
such as petroleum and minerals, is that conservation actually means 
"non-use.1/ Resources are thus conserved in the present, permitting 
their use sometime in the future. 
In the case of so-called flow resources, such as products of the 
soil or water in streams (where benefits of the resources will be lost if the 
resources are not utilized), conservation often implies a sustained-yield 
level of production. This means that the resource productivity base will 
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not be allowed to deteriorate, thus maintainin~ some pre -determined 
level of production. One often encounters this concept in the fields of 
plant ecology and range management. Confusion can arise if it isn't 
clear what the real products of the resources are, or if there is dis-
agreement as to the relative value of various products. Thus, if the 
targeted level of sustained-yield forage production, for example, is the 
maximum biological yield, it is conceivable that this can be achieved 
only in the complete absenceof livestock grazing. Accordingly, 
advocatf! s of water shed improvement might get what they want at the 
expense of commercial ranchers. 
Tp.e practical problem with the foregoing concepts of conservation 
is that they fail to account for economic considerations underlying 
resource management. Prevention of resource waste is hardly ever 
costless. American soil conservat~on programs, for example, are often" 
very expensive, yet agriculturallapd is plentiful at the present time. 
Thus, conservation programs are not nece s sarily good for society per 
se. It depends on the costs and returns of particular policies and 
programs. 
It is important that conservation issues be removed from the 
ideological and emotional planes in order to subject policies and programs 
to the rigors of feasibility analysis wherever possible. 
In an attempt to facilitate analytical advance, economi sts have 
defined conservation as a redistribution of resource use in the direction 
of the future. In this context conservation would be the opposite of 
depletion or exploitation which imply pre sent use at the expense of 
future use. Defined in this way, conservation is independent of ethical 
standards; i. e., it is not something good or bad. This definition does, 
how~ver, tend to draw attention to the possibility that balancing of 
present and future claims is the goal that must be optimized. The truth 
is that it is possible to use re.sources up too quickly und~r some circum-
stances and too slowly under others. The optimal level of conservation 
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depends among other things on the magnitude of particu!.ar re source 
endowments, the interest rate, resource productivity, and the costs and 
returns of re source regeneration. 
Critical Que stions 
A. Does exploitation of natural re source s imply an impoverish-
ment of posterity? The doctri.naire conservationist would say, yes, 
of course. There are just so many tons of minerals in the earth, a 
fixed qua.ntity of oil, and exploitation now means fewer re SOU:i"ce s avail-
able in the future. This position is much oversimplified, 
The economic welfare of future genei"ations is determined by the 
total endowment of economic wealth and capital accumulation which is 
passed on to them. Natural resource reserves are only a small part 
of this endowment. The vital thing to keep in mind is that natural re-
sources are gener2.11y an essential ingredient (but only one ingredient) 
in the production of all capital goods which constitute the total endow-
ment. Without the exploitation of natura! resources the production of 
capital goods might be much diminished. Therefore, if one is to look 
to the welfare of poste:t.lty, natural resource s should be used in such a 
way as to assure a high 1e",'-el total wealth endowment. This will 
necessitate the exploitation of resources over time, not their absolute 
conse:cvation. 
Of course, natural resources conceivably could be used up "too 
rapidly" by the pre sent generation, thus imposing heavy costs on some 
futu:ce generations. Sin-:e it is easy to guard aga.inst ove:i"-use of any 
resource for which future demand is clearly predictable (e. g" it was 
obvious late in the 19th century that fore st depletion had to be cUTtailed 
if 20th century demands were to be satisfied), over-use could only have 
two meaning s: 
1. Future generations discover a completely new technological 
process that is rendered difficult or impossible to exploit due 
to impTovidence of theiT forebear s. 
/.-
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2. Over-use means simply that the current generation makes 
"incorrect investments, " i. e., it passes on a stock of capital 
goods of lesser value than would have been attained utilizing 
hindsight. 
Whatever may be said in the way of assessing these possibilities 
pretty well boils down to the difficulty of predicting the future. Tastes, 
needs, incomes, and technology all change over time and shift the 
demand for natural resources. All this simply means that conservation 
mayor may not induce increased wealth for future generations of 
people. 
B. What effect does technological development have on conserva-
tion decisions? An intuitive guess is that progress in the "state of the 
arts" creates a systematic bias toward using resources too slowly. 
Large research expenditures are directed to finding substitutes for 
scarce or costly commoditie s or discovering more efficient ways of 
producing them, thus utilizing resources more effectively. Often these 
technological breakthroughs are not foreseen at all, and if so, very 
imperfectly. This means that technological advance almost always 
comes to society's rescue just when we seem to see serious resource 
shortages developing. Thus, fears of national impoverishment due to 
resource depletion seldom materialize; many programs to conserve 
resources, which are responses to such fears, might well be ill advised. 
As an example, in the early part of this century many pe?ple were 
worried about the ability of the American farmer to feed an ever-growing 
population. A feverish campaign to conserve soil and water resources 
developed along many fronts (including irri~ation projects to bring high 
productivity lands into production). Then in the 1940' sand 1950' s the 
so-called "technological revolution" in agriculture became a reality. 
It was apparent that the agricultural sector of the economy had made 
more rapid progress in increasing output per unit of input than any 
other. Agricultural economists now generally believe that Americans 
r 
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have a superabundance of agricultural land to meet their current needs 
and those of the foreseeable future. Indeed, technological progress has 
made it necessary to take a critical look at the economic feasibility 
of the costly conservation programs. The agricultural example is not 
unique. The same result may be in the offing for other natural resource 
areas: such as energy fuels (since commercial atomic energy is on 
the horizon). 
On the other hand, one must proceed with some caution and 
remember that technological advance is not always certain, Society 
must make resource-use decisions in the present, and it may be a little 
foolish to argue that because hindsight has shown that we have made 
past mistakes by being too pessimistic about the future, that we can 
abandon concern about saving resources for future generations" This 
is particularly true with respect to the really "criticalll resources o:q. 
which our civilization depends, lack of which would impose severe costs. 
In these cases the best rule might be Ilbetter-safe-than-sorry, II even 
though time rI)ay prove that over-conservation was the consequence. 
Excepting the better-safe-than-sorry situations, it is possible to 
say in conclusion that the rule should be to maximize resource contri-
butions to growth of national economic wealth (as the first approximation 
to setting gross exploitation rates). This can only be accomplished if 
society rids itself of as much emotional bias as possible in this area 
and subjects conservation policies to the rigors of rational economic 
analysis wherever possible. 
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APPENDIX 
Mathem.atics of Figure 28 
The results shown in Figure 28 are based on a very sim.ple function-
al relationship hetween revenue and cost, but they give insight into m.ore 
com.plex relationships. The conditions which hold for the m.axim.ization 
of the various criteria have been dem.onstrated by the Lutzes (13; pp. 18-20) 
and m.ay be paraphrased as follows: 
Revenue (R), = f(C) where G is the units of inve'stm.ent at t and 
o 
R accrues at a single m.om.ent at the end of the technically determ.ined 
-rt investm.ent period. The present value of Ris V = f(C)e ,where t 
is the fixed period and r is given. 
(a) V - C = f(C)e -rt_ C 
and the m.axim.izing condition is d(V - C) d(C) 
fl (C)e -rt = 0 
In the equation 
-p 
C = f(C)e at 
(1) 
= 0, which give s 
(2) 
(3) 
p repre sents the average internal rate of return, the rate if used to 
a 
discount down to the present all the revenues from. the investm.ent, m.akes 
their present value equal to the total cost of the investm.ent. In the 
equation 
-p 
1 = f' (C)e m.t (4) 
p repr'esents the m.arginal internal rate of return, the rate which, if 
m. 
used to discount down to the pre sent the m.arginal revenue due to an 
addi tional unit of funds inve sted, m.ake s the pre sent value of that revenue 
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equal to unity. Solving for p and p 
a m 
1 ( f(C) log C (5) =-t 
1 P = -log f'(C) 
m t 
(6) 
It follows from (2) and (4) that V - C is maximized when the marginal 
internal rate of return is equal to the rate of interest. The expression 
for the relationship between the marginal internal rate of return and 
the average internal rate satisfies the usual condition for equality between 
average and marginal values, i. e. , 
p (C) - p (C) where p '(C) = 0 
m a a 
or that Pm = P a when the latter is at its maximum. 
(b) VIC = 
f(C)e -rt 
C 
(7) 
(8) 
and the maxhnizing condition is f( C) e - rt - C [f' (C) e - rt ] " O. the refore. 
f(C) 
C = f' (C) (9) 
Taking the logarithms of both sides of (9) and multiplying by 1 It gives 
I 
t 
log ( f(C) ) = 
C 
1 
t 
log f' (C) (10) 
i. e., V I C is maximized where there is an equality between the average 
and marginal internal rate s of return. 
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(c) p maximization requires p = p as shown in (7) and 
a a m 
thus p maximization is identical with V Ie maximization. 
a . . 
(d) The conditions for the maximization of k';' are of no concern 
in the public investment case unless it ca,.n be imagined that the invest-
ment "agency" "holds" capital outside the Exchequer budget. However, 
the Lutzes have shown that in nearly all cases the investment that would 
maximize V - e would m2.ximize k as well (op. cit.: p. 42). 
(e) A possibility not considered by the Lutzesmight be thought 
to have some application in the public in'vestment situation. This would 
require investment such that V - e = 0, i. e., that "costs are just covered" 
Then from (l) and (3) 
f(e)e -rt _ f{e) - Pat = 0 
Dividing by f(e) gives 
rt ~p t 
e = e a 
and taking the logarithm of both side s give s 
-rt = - P t 
a 
(ll) 
(l2) 
(l3) 
and therefore V - e = 0 requires that the average internal rate of return 
P be set equal to the interest rate, r. 
a 
~!c 
k = owner's share of capital. 
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